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THE PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE OF
PROSECUTORS
FRED C. ZACHARIAS*
Numerous commentators have noted a lack of cases in which
disciplinary authorities have sanctioned prosecutors. Some argue
that the limited professional discipline of prosecutors, by
definition, has been inadequate. This Article analyzes that claim
dispassionately, by providing an empirical and theoretical look at
the reality of prosecutor discipline.
The Article first identifies the range of actions for which,
realistically, discipline might be imposed. It then considers
whether prosecutors are less likely than private lawyers to face
disciplinary action and, if so, the possible reasons for the
discrepancy. With this background, the Article attempts to identify
if, when, and why more discipline of prosecutors would benefit
society.
The final portion of the Article assumes the validity of existing
resource constraints. It suggests lines disciplinary authorities
might draw for when disciplinary action against prosecutors
should be instituted. The Article offers alternatives to discipline
that might represent more effective mechanisms for addressing the
concerns of those who lament the lack of bar action.
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INTRODUCION
In a frequently cited passage,' the United States Supreme Court
has justified immunizing prosecutors from civil lawsuits based, in part,
on the availability of professional discipline as an alternative remedy
for prosecutorial misconduct:
[A] prosecutor stands perhaps unique, among officials
whose acts could deprive persons of constitutional
rights, in his amenability to professional discipline by an
association of his peers
Numerous commentators have reacted by noting the dearth of
cases in which disciplinary authorities have sanctioned prosecutors
1. For examples of the many federal cases citing Imbler's famous passage, see Town
of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 413-14 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Malley v.
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 343 n.5 (1986); Schrob v. Catterson, 948 F.2d 1402, 1410 (3d Cir.
1991); Ehrlich v. Giuliani, 910 F.2d 1220, 1222 (4th Cir. 1990); Schloss v. Bouse, 876 F.2d
287, 292 (2d Cir. 1989); In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 487-88 (D.N.M. 1992). State courts
too often have referred to discipline as a significant alternative means for controlling
prosecutorial misconduct. See, e.g., Edward M. Genson & Marc W. Martin, The Epidemic
of Prosecutorial Courtroom Misconduct in Illinois: Is It Time to Start Prosecuting the
Prosecutors?, 19 LOY. U. CI. L.J. 39,40 n.5 (1987) (citing authorities).
2. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 429 (1976) (citing as support MODEL CODE OF
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1969)).
3. See, e.g., Genson & Martin, supra note 1, at 47 (noting that "[d]isciplinary
sanctions are rarely imposed against prosecutors" and proposing responses to that fact);
Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A
Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. Rav. 693, 697-98 (1987) (advocating new remedies for
prosecutorial misconduct because of the limited number of cases in which prosecutors
have been disciplined for withholding exculpatory information); Joseph R. Weeks, No
Wrong Without a Remedy: The Effective Enforcement of the Duty of Prosecutors to
Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 22 OKLA. CrrY U. L. REv. 833, 898 (1997) (arguing that
"the disciplinary process has been almost totally ineffective in sanctioning even egregious
Brady violations"); Lesley E. Williams, Note, The Civil Regulation of Prosecutors, 67
FORDHAM L. REv. 3441, 3464-77 (1999) (recounting examples of the limited discipline of
prosecutors); cf. Bruce A. Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors: Do Too Many Regulators
Produce Too Little Enforcement?, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 69, 69-70 & nn.6-8 (1995)
[hereinafter Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors] (discussing the "perceived failure of
disciplinary authorities" cited in the literature); Brian P. Barrow, Note, Buckley v.
Fitzsimmons: Tradition Pays a Price for the Reduction of Prosecutorial Misconduct, 16
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Most of their observations are tinged with an element of hand-
wringing. They bemoan the absence of discipline and suggest that
discipliners should correct a failure to do their jobs.4
This Article approaches the issue of discipline of prosecutors
from an impartial perspective. It starts from two baseline
propositions. First, there probably is a reason-maybe even a good
reason-for the rarity of discipline. Second, however, in light of the
frequent references to prosecutorial misconduct in the case law,5 the
lack of ensuing discipline is surprising. This Article attempts to assess
these propositions realistically.
Rather than presupposing institutional deficiencies on the part of
disciplinary authorities, Part I of the Article starts by analyzing the
range of actions for which discipline might be imposed. It
concentrates on full-time prosecutors, rather than on prosecutors who
must juggle the demands of a part-time civil practice 6 and who may
WHIrTIER L. REV. 301, 328 (1995) (arguing that professional discipline "has not been
applied to prosecutors with the force necessary to prevent egregious instances of
misconduct").
4. See, e.g., BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 1.8(d), at 1-
40, § 13.6, at 13-16 to 13-18 (1985) (arguing that discipline "is so rare as to make its use
virtually a nullity"); JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE
CRIMINAL LAWYER § 11:3, at 390 (2d ed. 1996) (noting the illusory nature of effective
discipline); Kenneth Rosenthal, Prosecutor Misconduct, Convictions, and Double
Jeopardy: Case Studies in an Emerging Jurisprudence, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 887, 889 (1998)
("[W]hile the prosecutor is theoretically subject to disciplinary codes [for misconduct],
there is a notable absence of disciplinary sanctions against prosecutors, even in the most
egregious cases."); Walter W. Steele, Jr., Unethical Prosecutors and Inadequate Discipline,
38 Sw. L. 965, 966-67 (1984) (arguing the existence of an increasing number of cases
involving flagrant prosecutorial misconduct); Lyn M. Morton, Note, Seeking the Elusive
Remedy for Prosecutorial Misconduct: Suppression, Dismissal, or Discipline?, 7 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 1083, 1086 (1994) ("[P]rosecutors are boldly crossing ethical boundaries,
unchecked because there are few remedial solutions available which effectively counter
the misconduct.").
5. For an excellent resource cataloguing cases involving alleged prosecutorial
misconduct, see GERSHMAN, supra note 4, passim.
6. Many of the cases in which prosecutors actually have been disciplined involve
part-time prosecutors. Part-time practice was common in the days before full-time
prosecution offices developed in most jurisdictions. Thus, many of the relevant cases are
of the older variety.
Beyond the conflict-of-interest cases described infra note 7, the most common
misconduct of part-time prosecutors was using the threat of prosecution to gain an
advantage for a civilian client. See, e.g., People ex reL Gallagher v. Hertz, 608 P.2d 335,
339 (Colo. 1979) (en banc) (special prosecutor-securities receiver suspended for six
months); People v. Attorneys Respondent, 427 P.2d 330, 331 (Colo. 1967) (prosecutor-
lawyer reprimanded); People ex reL Colo. Bar Ass'n v. Attorney at Law, 9 P.2d 611, 612
(Colo. 1932) (prosecutor-lawyer reprimanded); In re LaPinska, 381 N.E.2d 700, 705 (Ill.
1978) (city attorney-lawyer suspended for one year); In re Lantz, 420 N.E.2d 1236, 1237
(Ind. 1981) (per curiam) (prosecutor-lawyer reprimanded); In re Joyce, 234 N.W. 9, 10
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find the interests of private clients conflicting with the interests of the
state.7 Using the Model Rules of Professional Conduct8 as a guide,
Part I identifies professional code sections that apply to prosecutors
and that one might reasonably expect some prosecutors to violate. It
also attempts to separate direct code violations-those that would
best support discipline-from more generalized conduct that some
commentators may view to be "misconduct" but that may not
constitute a violation of the rules. In this way, Part I attempts to
(Minn. 1930) (county attorney-lawyer suspended for six months); In re Bunston, 155 P.
1109, 1111 (Mont. 1916) (county attorney-lawyer disbarred); In re Waggoner, 206 N.W.
427,432 (S.D. 1925) (state's attorney-lawyer suspended for three months).
7. See generally Richard H. Underwood, Part-time Prosecutors and Conflicts of
Interest: A Survey and Some Proposals, 81 KY. L.J. 1 (1993) (surveying conflicts and
proposing new guidelines for prosecutors). Numerous cases exist in which part-time
prosecutors have been disciplined for:
(1) representing conflicting interests as a prosecutor and defense attorney in the
same or similar proceeding, see, e.g., In re Patterson, 176 F.2d 966, 968 (9th Cir. 1949)
(Assistant United States Attorney reprimanded); State ex rel. Neb. State Bar Ass'n v
Hollstein, 274 N.W.2d 508, 518 (Neb. 1979) (city attorney censured); In re Becker, 203
N.Y.S. 437,442 (App. Div. 1924) (Deputy Attorney General suspended for three months);
In re Voss, 90 N.W. 15, 22 (N.D. 1902) (state's attorney suspended for nine months);
Maginnis' Case, 112 A. 555, 559 (Pa. 1921) (assistant district attorney suspended
indefinitely); In re Wakefield, 177 A. 319, 324 (Vt. 1935) (state's attorney suspended for
three months);
(2) participating in criminal and civil actions arising from the same facts, see, e.g.,
Ky. Bar Ass'n v. Lovelace, 778 S.W.2d 651, 654 (Ky. 1989) (commonwealth attorney
suspended for forty-five days); In re Truder, 17 P.2d 951, 952 (N.M. 1932) (district attorney
reprimanded); Application of In re Seneca County Bar Ass'n In re Koch, 93 N.Y.S.2d 141,
142 (App. Div. 1949) (district attorney held not subject to censure because he made full
disclosure to the grand jury before an indictment was handed down); In re Williams, 50
P.2d 729,732 (Okla. 1935) (county attorneys reprimanded); In re Jolly, 239 S.E.2d 490,491
(S.C. 1977) (per curiam) (circuit solicitor publicly reprimanded); In re Wilmarth, 172 N.W.
921, 926 (S.D. 1919) (state's attorney censured); In re Schull, 127 N.W. 541, 542-43,
modified on rehearing on other grounds, 128 N.W. 321, 322 (S.D. 1910) (district attorney
suspended for four-and-one-half months); cf. People ex rel Hutchison v. Hickman, 128
N.E. 484, 488 (Ill. 1920) (state's attorney not disciplined); In re Johnson, 131 N.W. 453, 457
(S.D. 1911) (state's attorney not disciplined because of insufficient evidence of improper
motive); and
(3) violating statutes specifically prohibiting the concurrent private practice of law,
see, e.g., In re Snyder, 559 P.2d 1273, 1275 (Or. 1976) (district attorney placed on one-year
probation).
8. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (1999). As of 1999, forty states have
adopted some form of the Model Rules. STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON,
REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS Xxiv-xxv (2000) (summarizing
state adoptions of the American Bar Association's (ABA) two model codes). The Model
Rules are particularly useful for analyzing prosecutorial misconduct because they, unlike
the predecessor MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY (1969), contain a rule that
directly addresses some specific prosecutorial conduct. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 3.8 (1999).
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identify and focus upon sanctionable violations that prosecutors in
the real world are likely to commit on a regular basis.
Part II then compares disciplinary cases involving prosecutorial
conduct to cases involving similar conduct of private attorneys. It
considers whether prosecutors are less likely than private lawyers to
face disciplinary action and, if so, the possible reasons for the
disparate treatment. In part, this analysis is empirical. Part II.A
looks at the range of actual reported cases in which disciplinary
proceedings have been brought against prosecutors. Part II.B
compares prosecutor discipline with the discipline of private lawyers.
Part I.C evaluates the possible justifications for the limited discipline
of prosecutors, including substantive reasons why prosecutors should
not be disciplined for particular code violations, practical
impediments to discipline, and the availability of alternative remedies
for prosecutorial misconduct.
With this background, Part III attempts to identify whether,
when, and why more discipline of prosecutors would benefit society.
It analyzes when deterrence of prosecutorial misconduct through
professional discipline is particularly important and when alternative
remedies are inadequate to provide deterrence. Part III also
considers the societal costs of failing to enforce the codes fully.
Finally, Part IV makes recommendations. It assumes the validity
of existing resource constraints and suggests lines that disciplinary
authorities might draw. Part IV offers alternatives to discipline that
might more effectively address the concerns of those who lament the
lack of bar action.
I. THE INAPPLICABILITY OF MANY PROFESSIONAL RULES TO
PROSECUTORS
Allegations of prosecutorial misconduct abound in the cases and
academic literature. Not surprisingly, commentators have concluded
that professional discipline should serve as a frequently administered
check on prosecutorial wrongdoing.9  Many of the rules of
professional conduct, however, are blunt instruments-altogether
inapplicable, or barely applicable, to full-time prosecutors.1 This,
combined with the special characteristics of prosecutors and the
activities they engage in, helps explain the rarity of discipline.
9. See supra notes 3-4.
10. Bruce Green and I note this phenomenon in Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A.
Green, The Uniqueness of Federal Prosecutors, 88 GEO. L.J. 207,225-35 (2000).
2001]
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Many professional rules do not pertain equally to prosecutors
because of the nature of prosecutors' clientele, prosecutors' salaried
status, or specific government rules that control prosecutors'
conduct." For example, one feature distinguishing prosecutors from
private lawyers is their lack of dominant individual clients or multiple
clients of any type. Prosecutors represent only "the state" or "the
people."'" Prosecutors have significant, often controlling, discretion
to determine which constituency of the state should be considered
dominant in any particular case. 3 As a result, rules governing
conflicts among clients 4 and rules designed to protect the autonomy
and decision-making authority 5 of clients rarely apply to them.
Moreover, because prosecutors work on a salaried basis and do
not tailor financial arrangements with clients on a case-by-case basis,
client-protective rules governing fees and retainer agreements never
come into play. 6 Rules governing other business aspects of private
11. Specific statutes or administrative rules often limit the extent to which prosecutors
(and other government attorneys) may engage in pro bono legal activities or private
representation. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 205 (West 2000) (regulating participation in
matters affecting the government); Exec. Order No. 12988, 61 Fed. Reg. 4729 (Feb. 5,
1996), reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. § 519 (West 2000) (mandating that "all federal agencies"
develop programs governing pro bono activity).
12. Government attorneys sometimes do have to address the question of who the
client is when an agency or its representatives are involved in the litigation. See infra note
28. Criminal prosecutors, however, face this conflict less frequently than other
government attorneys because, in the ordinary criminal case, the prosecutors are the sole
representatives of the state's interests.
13. As the representative of "the state" in criminal cases, the prosecutor, in theory,
must consider the interests of the victims of crimes; society's interests in retribution,
punishment, deterrence, and rehabilitation of criminals; and the preservation of crime-
fighting, prosecutorial, and correctional resources, as well as the defendants' rights and
interests in a fair trial. See Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial
Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REv. 45, 57 (1991) [hereinafter
Zacharias, Can Prosecutors Do Justice?] (discussing prosecutors' various constituencies);
see also Roberta K. Flowers, A Code of Their Own: Updating the Ethics Codes to Include
the Non-Adversarial Roles of Federal Prosecutors, 37 B.C. L. REV. 923, 930-34 (1996)
[hereinafter Flowers, Updating the Ethics Codes] (discussing the role of the prosecutor as
"an advocate without a singular client" and "without a singular purpose"); Bruce A.
Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 607, 626 n.84
(1999) [hereinafter Green, Seek Justice] (arguing that a prosecutor's singular client is the
state, rather than the victims, police, or any other constituency).
14. See, e.g., MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDucT R. 1.7-1.10 (1999). For
prosecutors who previously engaged in private practice, the rules protecting against
conflicts involving former clients may come into play. See supra note 3 and accompanying
text.
15. See generally Fred C. Zacharias, Limits on Autonomy in Legal Ethics Regulation,
81 B.U. L. REv. 198 (2001) (discussing a range of code provisions that protect or remove
from clients the power to make decisions).
16. See, e.g., MODEL RULEs OF PROF'L CoNDucT R. 1.5 (1999) (governing fees); id.
R. 1.8(a), (c)-(e), (j) (governing specific types of fee arrangements).
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practice, including advertising, solicitation, 7 and other law firm
practices, 8 also have little meaning for prosecutors. Table I lists some
of the important provisions in the Model Rules that, for practical
purposes, simply lack relevance to the work life of prosecutors.
17. See, e.g., id R. 7.1-7.3 (regulating solicitations and advertising).
18. See, e.g., id R. 5.3-5.4,5.7 (regarding associations with nonlawyers).
2001]
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19. Some of the provisions in Model Rule 1.8 might apply, such as Rule 1.8(i)'s
prohibition on litigating against a relative and Rule 1.8(j)'s prohibition against acquisition
of a proprietary interest in the subject of a case. However, Rule 1.8 envisions mainly
financial and other conflicts of interest that arise with respect to lawyers who have
financial incentives to engage in particular types of private representation.
20. Although Model Rule 1.9 does apply to prosecutors, the separate guidelines in
Model Rule 1.11 address successive conflicts of prosecutors more specifically.
21. Prosecutors occasionally must testify about alleged pretrial misconduct in the
present or previous cases. In these instances, Model Rule 3.7 may be applicable. Courts
are loath, however, to order prosecutors to testify because defense attorneys may
subpoena prosecutors for tactical reasons, to gain access to otherwise unavailable
discovery.
22. Like private attorneys, prosecutors are responsible for supervising the behavior of
paralegals, externs, and secretaries who work for them. However, the requirements of
Model Rule 5.3 do not make prosecutors responsible for the conduct of police officers or
other investigative agents. Those officials typically act under independent authority and
are not fully subject to prosecutorial control.
TABLE I
Client and Practice-Oriented Rules
Not Equally Applicable to Prosecutors
1.2 Limiting objectives, advising law violations
1.4 Communicating with clients
1.5 Fees
1.7 Conflicts among clients
1.8 Specific conflicts 9 .
1.9 Successive conflicts among clients2
1.14 Clients with a disability
1.15 Safekeeping property
1.17 Selling a law practice
2.2 Acting as an intermediary among clients
2-3 Evaluatingmatters for third persons
3.7 Serving as a witness2'
3.9 Appearing in nonadjudicative p roceeding
5.3 Controlling nonlawyers22
5.4 Fee sharing,and joint enterprises
5.5 Engaging in unauthorized practice of law
5.6 Accepting restrictions on the right to practice
5.7 Providing law related services
6.1 Pro bono service
6.2 Seeking/accepting appointments
7.1-.5 Advertising and solicitation
[Vol. 79728
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In addition to those professional rules that are inapplicable to
prosecutors, there are rules which might apply but which, in practice,
prosecutors are unlikely to violate. For example, prosecutors have
constitutional 3 and statutory24 incentives not to delay trials, and so
are less likely than private attorneys to violate rules requiring lawyers
to expedite litigation 5  Prosecutors who must appear repeatedly
before the same judges are less likely than private lawyers to engage
in conduct disruptive to a tribunal26 (though prosecutors occasionally
also transgress2 7). Because prosecutors typically control decisions
made by the government in a particular case, many provisions
regulating lawyers for organizational clients are less likely to be
implicated.' Table II lists some of those provisions for which
prosecutors could be, but are unlikely to be, disciplined for violating.
23. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial."); see also Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-31
(1972) (adopting a balancing test for determining when the right to a speedy trial has been
violated, including the factor of whether the government deliberately attempted to delay
trial).
24. See, e.g., Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3162, 3164 (1994) (setting
firm time limits for bringing defendants to trial in federal cases). Similarly, all states have
some constitutional or statutory provisions guaranteeing speedy trials to criminal
defendants. See YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1114 (9th ed.
1999).
25. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 3.2 (1999) (requiring lawyers to
"make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation"). To put the point more accurately,
prosecutors' tactical incentives to delay trial typically are counterbalanced by the serious
risk of dismissal if the prosecutors implement the tactical incentives.
Bennett Gershman has collected some cases in which prosecutors have sought to
delay trial for tactical reasons. See GERSHMAN, supra note 4, § 8.2(b)(2), at 8-7. The
limited number of such cases is explicable on the basis that all of the cases Gershman cites
involve allegations of constitutional violations of due process and the right to a speedy
trial. Delay will always be obvious to defense counsel. Prosecutors thus have special
reason to avoid it.
26. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.5(c) (1999) (forbidding lawyers to
"engage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal").
27. See infra note 36.
28. Thus, for example, while Model Rule 1.13 requires lawyers for organizations,
including government attorneys, to "go up the ladder" with respect to certain
organizational decisions with which they disagree, individual criminal prosecutors typically
get to make most decisions regarding their prosecutions on their own. Fewer situations
calling for a climb "up the ladder" present themselves. But cf Catherine J. Lanctot, The
Duty of Zealous Advocacy and the Ethics of the Federal Government Lawyer: The Three
Hardest Questions, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 951, 952 (1991) (discussing obligations of a
government lawyer when an agency official's wishes contradict the lawyer's judgment);
Jack B. Weinstein & Gay A. Crosthwait, Some Reflections on Conflicts Between
Government Attorneys and Clients, 1 TOURO L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1985) (discussing obligations
of government lawyers when commitment to "the law" conflicts with the interests of the
government client); James R. Harvey, III, Note, Loyalty in Government Litigation:
Department of Justice Representation of Agency Clients, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1569,
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TABLE H
Provisions Prosecutors are Unlikely to Violate
1.6 Confidentiality29
1.7(b) Conflicts with own interests or professional judgment'
1.13 Lawyer for organizational client..
3.2 Expediting litigation
3.5(a) Seeking to influence judge improperly32
3.5(c) Engaging in conduct disruptive to tribunal
6.3, 6.4 Membership in legal services organizations
33
8.1 Falsifying information regarding bar applications4
1569 (1996) (considering what lawyers for the United States Department of Justice should
"do when an agency asks it to litigate a matter that the Department does not consider to
be in the best interests of the government"). However, at least one commentator has
observed that the ability of prosecutors to engage in unconstrained decision-making has
diminished over time and has urged an express duty to "seek ethical supervision." Rory
K. Little, Proportionality as an Ethical Precept for Prosecutors in Their Investigative Role,
68 FORDHAM L. REV. 723, 763-67 (1999).
29. Prosecutors have a duty of confidentiality. But, because they have a single client
(i.e., the state) and no need to garner business, prosecutors have fewer incentives than
private lawyers to violate confidentiality rules. In a few cases involving acceptance of
bribes, prosecutors have been disciplined for breaching their duty of confidentiality. See,
e.g., In re Cowdery, 10 P. 47, 65-66 (Cal. 1886) (outgoing county attorney who accepted a
bribe for not passing information to his successor violated confidentiality in discussions
with the briber); In re Robinson, 420 N.Y.S.2d 430, 432 (App. Div. 1979) (finding that
Assistant United States Attorney who divulged information to suspected organized crime
members breached his duty of confidentiality); In re McNerthney, 621 P.2d 731, 733
(Wash. 1980) (prosecutor admonished for revealing the existence of search warrant).
Other confidentiality situations might arise when a prosecutor is tempted to reveal to the
public information that superiors or agency representatives wish to hide. Such situations
probably are relatively rare.
30. One might expect prosecutors to confront the same conflicts as private attorneys.
But, because prosecutors are part of a large organization of lawyers who perform similar
functions, district attorneys can more easily transfer cases in-house than law firm
managers. Personal or financial incentives to please clients do not encourage individual
prosecutors to keep cases they should transfer to another. Only "cultural limitations"
within an office-which may be substantial in some agencies-militate against internal
transfer of cases.
Practical considerations may prevent full enforcement of the conflict rules against
prosecutors even when the rules apply. For example, regulators differentiate between
prosecutors' offices and private firms in determining whether one prosecutor's conflict of
interest must be imputed to other prosecutors. See Zacharias & Green, supra note 10, at
222 & n.92. The regulators clearly hesitate to disqualify the whole agency from doing its
job.
31. Because prosecutors control the legal decisions in a case, they need to consider
Model Rule 1.13(b)'s requirement that they seek the permission of higher authorities to
reverse a client's instructions only in exceptional or highly publicized cases in which high-
level agency personnel become involved in the handling of the matter. Cf. DEBORAH
RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE METHOD 483-88
[Vol. 79
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We will return to the remaining provisions of the professional
codes presently. But first, let us consider the range and nature of
"prosecutorial misconduct" that has prompted commentators to
complain of the lack of oversight. Allegations of prosecutorial
misconduct typically concern five broad areas of activity: (1) abuse of
office in the charging stage; (2) abuses in investigating crimes,
including misuse of grand juries; (3) pretrial misconduct, including
discovery abuses; (4) trial misconduct; and (5) miscellaneous other
activities. Table III subdivides these areas into the main causes of
complaint.
(2d ed. 1998) (discussing the internal office dispute over the handling of the Japanese-
American internment cases before the United States Supreme Court). Similarly, because
the government typically handles civil and criminal matters separately, prosecutors rarely
find themselves representing both the state and an individual official of the state in the
way envisioned by Rule 1.13(e).
32. Realistically, prosecutors rarely have the incentives, financial means, or client
connections that would drive them to bribe a judge.
33. State and federal laws regulate prosecutors' participation in outside legal
activities. See, e.g, 5 C.F.R. §§ 735.203, 2635.703(a) (1999) (forbidding government
attorneys to engage in outside activities, maintain a financial interest inconsistent with
obligations to the government, or misuse confidential information).
34. Prosecutors are unlikely to falsify bar applications because they know they will
have to undergo government security checks that would reveal mistruths.
2001]
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TABLE m
Stages of Prosecutorial Misconduct
Investigation Stage35
Misusing the grand jury process
36
Examining suspects improperly
Authorizing improper contacts with represented persons37
Making misrepresentations to witnesses or defendants3 8
Representing interests that conflict with the prosecutor's
own (political?) interests
Screening Stage
Charging without sufficient evidence 39
Overcharging for bargaining purposes4
Pretrial Stage
Failing to disclose exculpatory evidence4'
Interfering with defendants' access to witnesses42
Trial Stage




Making improper public statements'
Failing to report misconduct/ineffectiveness of other
lawyers47
35. Misconduct in the investigation context may involve prosecutors' participation in
interrogations of suspects and witnesses or participation in police searches and seizures.
Potentially pertinent rules include Model Rules 4.1 (forbidding misrepresentations), 4.2
(forbidding contacts with represented parties), and 4.3 (regulating communications with
unrepresented parties). See generally Flowers, Updating the Ethics Codes, supra note 13,
at 927 (advocating special professional rules governing prosecutors' involvement in the
investigative process).
36. See, e.g., GERSHMAN, supra note 4, § 2.1, at 2-5 (listing seven varieties of alleged
prosecutorial misconduct before grand juries); id. § 2.2, at 2-7 n.22 (citing cases in which
courts have recommended that disciplinary proceedings be brought against prosecutors for
misconduct before the grand jury); Jeffrey S. Edwards, Prosecutorial Misconduct, 30 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 1221, 1224, 1225-30 (1993) ("The reported cases describe numerous
instances and kinds of prosecutorial misconduct," including "interference with the
defendant's attorney-client relationship[s]," evidentiary misconduct, and "procedural
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violations."); Douglas P. Currier, Note, The Exercise of Supervisory Powers to Dismiss a
Grand Jury Indictment-A Basis for Curbing Prosecutorial Misconduct, 45 OHIO ST. L.
1077, 1077 (1984) (arguing for increased exercise of the power to dismiss indictments as a
means of curbing prosecutorial grand jury misconduct); cf. Frank 0. Bowman, III, A
Bludgeon by Any Other Name: The Misuse of "Ethical Rules" Against Prosecutors to
Control the Law of the State, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 665, 669 (1996) (challenging the use
of ethics rules to control prosecutorial conduct in the grand jury and investigative stages).
37. See authorities cited infra note 65.
38. See, e.g., United States v. Martino, 825 F.2d 754, 757 (3d Cir. 1987) (use of sham
grand jury subpoenas to trick targets of sting operation); People v. Auld, 815 P.2d 956, 957
(Colo. Ct. App. 1991) (prosecutor participated in sting operation by drafting fictitious
complaint and soliciting perjury by undercover agent); Nigrone v. Murtagh, 362 N.Y.S.2d
513, 517 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974) (prosecutor presented false case to grand jury in order to
further a sting operation).
39. See, e.g., Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 85 (1971) (noting the possible availability
of injunctive relief against "prosecutions undertaken by state officials in bad faith without
hope of obtaining a valid conviction"); David W. Simon, Fighting Back- Remedies for the
Wrongfully Prosecuted?, 71 Wis. LAW. 10, 12-13, 56-57 (1998) (supporting the Hyde
Amendment's attempt to remedy the perceived problem of wrongful charging through
fee-shifting).
40. See Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial
Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 851, 853 (1995)
(proposing financial remedy for prosecutorial "overcharging"). In light of the broad range
of prosecutorial discretion courts recognize at the charging stage, most allegations of
prosecutorial misconduct at this stage focus on "vindictive" prosecutions. See
GERSHMAN, supra note 4, § 4.4(a)(2)(A), at 4-31 (discussing Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S.
21 (1974) and its progeny).
41. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 3, at 697 ("[D]espite the universal adoption by the
states of Disciplinary Rules prohibiting prosecutorial suppression of exculpatory evidence
and falsification of evidence, and despite numerous reported cases showing violations of
these rules, disciplinary charges have been brought infrequently and meaningful sanctions
rarely applied.") (footnotes omitted); Weeks, supra note 3, at 835 (arguing that
prosecutors routinely are tempted to, and probably do, withhold exculpatory evidence
from the defense); Edward L. Wilkinson, Brady and Ethics: A Prosecutor's Evidentiary
Duties to the Defense Under the Due Process Clause and their Relation to the State Bar
Rules, 61 TEx. BJ. 435, 440-41 (1998) (discussing instances of failure to disclose evidence
that violate the professional rules); Edwin H. Auler, Comment, Actions Against
Prosecutors Who Suppress or Falsify Evidence, 47 TEX. L. REv. 642, 642 (1969) (urging a
broad array of remedies for prosecutors' "disregard [for] their professional responsibilities
by suppressing evidence").
42. See Zacharias, Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, supra note 13, at 81-83 & nn.159-69
(discussing the legal rules against interfering with access to witnesses).
43. See Rosen, supra note 3, at 702 (arguing the existence of prosecutorial misconduct
in the use of false evidence); Auler, supra note 41, at 643 (arguing the need for remedies to
deter prosecutors from falsifying evidence).
44. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial
Judges, 50 TEx. L. REv. 629, 648, 651 (1972) (discussing prosecutorial misconduct in
closing argument); J. Thomas Sullivan, Prosecutorial Misconduct in Closing Argument in
Arkansas Criminal Trials, 20 U. ARK. LrrrLE ROCK L. REV. 213, 220-22 (1998)
(describing alleged prosecutorial misconduct in summations); Zacharias, Can Prosecutors
Do Justice?, supra note 13, at 95-102 & n.219 (discussing the ethical boundaries of
argument by prosecutors).
45. See, e.g., United States v. DiLoreto, 888 F.2d 996, 999 (3d Cir. 1989) (finding it per
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In each of these areas of prosecutorial activity, commentators
tend to refer vaguely to "prosecutorial misconduct."' *  But
"misconduct" alone, even when it exists, does not always rise to the
level of a disciplinable offense. Disciplinary authorities, for the most
part, limit themselves to enforcing only direct violations of specific
requirements or prohibitions in the professional codes.49 The codes
do not address much of the prosecutorial misconduct alleged in the
cases and commentary. The codes, for example, do not deal directly
with important aspects of prosecutorial participation in improper
police conduct 5 -- including entrapment,51 improper investigations,
se reversible error for a prosecutor to state "[w]e don't put liars on the stand"); United
States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1178 (2d Cir. 1981) (finding error resulting from
prosecutors' vouching for witnesses); cf Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Profession's Rule
Against Vouching for Clients: Advocacy and "The Manner that is the Man Himself," 7
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 145, 146 (1993) (discussing the justifications for
vouching rules).
46. See, e.g., GERSHMAN, supra note 4, § 6.1, at 6-2 (asserting that "[p]rosecutors
violate these rules either deliberately or inadvertently"); Kevin Cole & Fred C. Zacharias,
The Agony of Victory and the Ethics of Lawyer Speech, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1627, 1630-37
(1996) (discussing the bounds of and justifications for limiting extra-judicial speech by
attorneys on both sides and identifying potentially improper speech by prosecutors and
defense attorneys in the O.J. Simpson case); Scott M. Matheson, Jr., The Prosecutor, The
Press, and Free Speech, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 865, 869 n.16, 871-78 (1990) (analyzing
professional restrictions on prosecutorial statements to the press).
47. I have argued previously that prosecutors have a special obligation to bring lax
performance or improper conduct by defense counsel to the attention of the authorities.
Zacharias, Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, supra note 13, at 66-74. In general, of course, the
professional rules only require lawyers to report other lawyers when they violate
significant aspects of the professional rules. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDuCr R. 8.3(a) (1999) (requiring reporting by "a lawyer having knowledge that
another lawyer has committed a violation of the rules of professional conduct that raises a
substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer").
Yet, the reporting requirement is honored largely in the breach.
48. The phrase "prosecutorial misconduct" is bandied about relatively
indiscriminately. A Westlaw search for the phrase in the law reviews alone resulted in
1541 articles that employ it.
49. See Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes: Theory,
Practice, and the Paradigm of Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 223, 249-57
(1993) [hereinafter Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes] (explaining
the relationship between specificity in the professional codes and the enforceability of the
norms the codes establish).
50. See, e.g., Little, supra note 28, at 751-63 (discussing the ramifications of increased
participation by prosecutors in police investigations). Obviously, a prosecutor who is
found to have acted illegally (e.g., in conjunction with a police officer) will be subject to
discipline. But professional codes and professional discipline are concerned mostly with
prosecutors' improper conduct in their capacity as lawyers. The codes do include a few
provisions that seem to encompass some pretrial investigative conduct. See, e.g., MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 1.2(d) (1999) (prohibiting advising a violation of the law,
which may implicate prosecutorial participation in improper police activity); id. R. 4.2
(forbidding some prosecutorial supervision of undercover operations, at least as
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and searches or interrogations that result in the exclusion of
evidence 2 Even lawyerly activities such as misusing a grand jury to
fish for evidence,5 3 threatening potential witnesses, charging witnesses
or defendants with crimes for tactical reasons,54 and abusing the plea
bargaining5 and sentencing56 processes are activities that the codes
refer to only obliquely, if at ally
interpreted by some jurisdictions).
51. See GERSHMAN, supra note 4, § 1.2, at 1-3 to 1-4 (discussing prosecutorial
misconduct that can arise when prosecutors become involved in police entrapment) and
authorities cited therein.
52. See id. §§ 1.3, 1.7 (discussing misconduct arising from prosecutorial involvement in
"staged arrests, scams, and stings" and in "illegal eavesdropping") and authorities cited
therein.
53. See id. §§ 2.3-2.9 (discussing prosecutorial misconduct in the use of the grand jury)
and authorities cited therein.
54. See, e.g., United States v. Under Seal, 714 F.2d 347, 350 (4th Cir. 1983)
(questioning the authority of prosecutors to use grand jury proceedings and the threat of
charges to coerce witnesses to cooperate with the government); see also Bruce A. Green,
"Package" Plea Bargaining and the Prosecutor's Duty of Good Faith, 25 CRIM. L. BULL.
507, 514-16 (1989) [hereinafter Green, Package Plea Bargaining] (discussing the
obligations of prosecutors in threatening to charge family members of the actual targets of
their investigations). But cf. Ostrer v. Aronwald, 434 F. Supp. 396, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(rejecting a claim of coercive subpoena).
55. See generally GERSHMAN, supra note 4, §§ 7.2-7.5 (citing a variety of conduct that
the author believes rises to the level of prosecutorial misconduct) and authorities cited
therein. Indeed, because plea bargaining typically is viewed as a quintessential aspect of
prosecutorial discretion, the codes leave prosecutors at sea on the question of what "just"
and ethical plea bargaining encompasses. See also Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and
Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 957, 1026 (1989) (arguing for
increased responsibility of prosecutors for making disclosures during the plea bargaining
process); David Aaron, Note, Ethics, Law Enforcement, and Fair Dealing: A Prosecutor's
Duty to Disclose Nonevidentiary Information, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3005, 3007 (1999)
(acknowledging that the professional codes do not explicitly require prosecutors to
disclose important nonevidentiary information during plea bargaining, but urging the
adoption of a new ethical standard). See generally Fred C. Zacharias, Justice in Plea
Bargaining, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1121 (1998) [hereinafter Zacharias, Plea
Bargaining] (discussing what constitutes just behavior by prosecutors in the plea
bargaining process).
56. See, e.g., Tucker v. Zant, 724 F.2d 882, 889-90 (11th Cir. 1984) (finding that a
prosecutor's conduct at sentencing rendered the sentencing "fundamentally unfair");
Hance v. Zant, 696 F.2d 940, 951 (11th Cir. 1983) (reversing a death penalty imposed after
a "prosecutor's fervent appeal to the fears and emotions" of the sentencing jury); United
States v. Alverson, 666 F.2d 341, 349 (9th Cir. 1982) (remanding for resentencing because
of prosecutor's ex parte communications with the original sentencing judge); cf.
GERSHMAN, supra note 4, § 12.1, at 12-4 ("By its very nature the sentencing process lends
itself to prosecutorial abuse."); Paul M. Secunda, Cleaning Up the Chicken Coop of
Sentencing Uniformity: Guiding the Discretion of Federal Prosecutors Through the Use of
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1267, 1282, 1286 (1997)
(noting the limited guidance that the professional rules provide for prosecutors exercising
sentencing discretion and proposing a new rule).
57. The Model Rules do forbid a prosecutor from instituting charges that are not
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Regulators sometimes can construe otherwise unspecified
prosecutorial misconduct as falling under the rubric of "dishonest"
behavior,58 conduct "prejudicial to the administration of justice,"5 9 or
conduct reflecting "[un]fitness as a lawyer."'  But it is difficult and
expensive to establish general misconduct that does not involve direct
rule violations as grounds for professional sanctions.6' Both inside
and outside the prosecutorial realm, disciplinary authorities are loath
to pursue such cases.6'
Another reason why the perceived misconduct listed in Table III
rarely gives rise to discipline is that much of the behavior in question
involves traditional areas of prosecutorial discretion. Almost by
definition, reasonable observers differ on what conduct is appropriate
in these areas. Thus, for example, so long as some evidence supports
a criminal charge, observers typically disagree over the propriety of a
prosecutor's decision to support a police arrest pending further
investigation. Similarly, some consider aggressive charging within
constitutional limits to be a valid exercise of discretion, while others
consider it to be "overcharging." For the most part, even aggressive
prosecutors will limit themselves to this range of disputable conduct;
they are unlikely to exceed constitutional limits intentionally63 for fear
of losing a conviction on appeal.61
supported by probable cause but, in the view of many, that is a low threshold. See MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 3.8(a) (1999) (setting a threshold for charging). The
Model Rules also offer vague assurances that prosecutors will generally respect
defendants' rights but, for the most part, do not impose specific limits on use of the
interrogation, grand jury, or plea bargaining processes. See, e.g., id. R. 3.8(b)-(c)
(requiring prosecutors to make reasonable efforts to make sure that an accused can obtain
counsel and avoid waivers of pretrial rights); id. R. 3.8(f) (limiting the authority of
prosecutors to subpoena lawyers to the grand jury).
58. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 8.4(c) (1999) (forbidding
lawyers to "engage in conduct involving dishonesty").
59. Id. R. 8.4(d).
60. Id. R. 8.4(b) (forbidding lawyers to commit criminal acts that reflect "adversely on
the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects").
61. See Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes, supra note 49, at
253-54 (discussing the variables governing the decision to institute disciplinary
proceedings).
62. See supra text accompanying note 50 (discussing discipline for prosecutors'
participation in illegal activities). Discretionary acts or acts that arguably are
constitutionally permitted are unlikely to be viewed as the type of intentional misconduct
that justifies bar sanction. Nor, in the absence of clearly proscribed conduct, are
disciplinary authorities likely to enter the debate over when lawyers have acted too
aggressively, or not aggressively enough, in prosecuting crimes. See Zacharias, Can
Prosecutors Do Justice?, supra note 13, at 48 (noting that vague standards governing
prosecutorial conduct can be used to justify virtually any stance prosecutors may choose to
adopt).
63. Although an intent to violate the professional code is rarely a prerequisite to
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In other areas listed in Table III, the substantive question of
what constitutes misconduct is itself legally controversial. For
example, prosecutors steadfastly have maintained a right to contact
represented persons before their indictment, even when professional
codes seem to forbid that conduct.65 The extent to which prosecutors,
like the police, may mislead witnesses and defendants into making
confessions or cooperating with an investigation has always been
difficult to define--even for the courts.' How far prosecutors may go
in suggesting that prosecution witnesses not cooperate with the
defense is another subject of legal dispute.67 In these areas,
disciplinary authorities correctly assume that any attempt to impose
discipline for conduct that prosecutors insist is legitimate will embroil
the disciplinary agency in litigation and aggressive claims by
prosecutorial agencies that professional discipline violates the
separation of powers.6 One might expect the regulators to avoid
discipline, disciplinary agencies are more likely to prosecute knowing violations of the
rules than well-intended, zealous representation that includes inadvertent misconduct. See
infra note 120 and accompanying text.
64. See, e.g., Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29 (1974) (barring a felony charge
filed in retaliation for defendant's exercise of his right to trial leading to a misdemeanor
conviction); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 13.5, at 638-41 (2d ed. 1992) (discussing vindictive prosecution cases).
65. See, e.g., Rory K. Little, Who Should Regulate the Ethics of Federal Prosecutors?,
65 FORDHAM L. REv. 355, 423-27 (1996) (arguing in support of the Department of
Justice's position that states' adoptions of Model Rule 4.2 do not bind attorneys
representing the federal government). For a history of the controversy surrounding the
rule against communications with represented persons and a review of the authorities on
the subject, see Zacharias & Green, supra note 10, at 212 n.21; Fred C. Zacharias, Who
Can Best Regulate the Ethics of Federal Prosecutors, Or, Who Should Regulate the
Regulators?, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 429, 429-30 nn.1-2 & 7 (1996) [hereinafter Zacharias,
Who Can Best Regulate]; see also authorities cited in Corinna Barrett Lain, Prosecutorial
Ethics Under the Reno Rule: Authorized by Law?, 14 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 17, 22-24
(Summer/Fall No.2 1995) (questioning the legal authority of federal prosecutors to resist
rules against communications with represented persons); Amy R. Mashburn, A Clockwork
Orange Approach to Legal Ethics: A Conflicts Perspective on the Regulation of Lawyers
by Federal Courts, 8 GEO. J. LEG. ETHIcs 473, 494 (1995) (arguing that "the DOJ's
[challenge to Model Rule 4.2] takes the concept of attorney self-regulation to the most
extreme manifestation imaginable"); Neals-Erik William Delker, Comment, Ethics and the
Federal Prosecutor: The Continuing Conflict over the Application of Model Rule 4.2 to
Federal Attorneys, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 855, 858-59 nn.16-19 (1995) (discussing the
controversy over Model Rule 4.2).
66. For a collection of authorities and an empirical review of the interaction between
prosecutors and potential cooperating witnesses, see Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with
Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth-telling and Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L.
REV. 917 (1999).
67. See Zacharias, Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, supra note 13, at 81-85 (discussing
the obligations of prosecutors in controlling defense counsels' access to witnesses).
68. See, e.g., Massameno v. Statewide Grievance Comm., 663 A.2d 317, 325-26 (Conn.
1995) (rejecting prosecutor's separation of powers challenge to the application of
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such controversies and to concentrate their resources elsewhere until
the legal issues have been adjudicated.
69
The above analysis suggests that there is a fairly narrow range of
areas in which one realistically would expect prosecutors to engage in
misconduct and in which disciplinary authorities are likely to have
both the wherewithal and the inclination to proceed. These areas
include primarily: (1) pretrial and trial conduct that is specifically
forbidden in the codes; (2) engaging in pretrial publicity; and (3) the
implementation of prosecutors' obligations to report other lawyers.
The remainder of this Article focuses on those clear, sustainable rule
violations within these areas that most reasonable observers would
expect disciplinary authorities to prosecute-at least occasionally.
Table IV lists all of the code provisions that some prosecutors
probably do violate and that might come to the attention of
regulators.
professional rules to him); see also Melissa K. Atwood, Comment, Who Has the Last
Word?: An Examination of the Authority of State Bar Grievance Committees to Investigate
and Discipline Prosecutors for Breaches of Ethics, 22 J. LEGAL PRoF. 201, 204-06 &
nn.23-27 (1998) (noting "a possible 'separation of powers' problem when it comes to the
judiciary enforcing its rules of professional conduct on attorneys who are officers of the
executive branch").
69. See Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes, supra note 49, at




Code Provisions Some Prosecutors Probably Violate
1.1, 1.3 Competence, Diligence
1.11 Successive conflicts for government lawyers
3.1 Making nonmeritorious claims
3.3(a)(1) Making false statements to a tribunal
3.3(a)(3) Failing to disclose controlling authority to a tribunal
3.3(a)(4) Offering false evidence
3.4(a) Obstructing access to or unlawfully concealing
evidence
3.4(b) Falsifying evidence, counseling a witness to testify
falsely, offering a witness prohibited inducements
3.4(c) Knowingly disobeying a legal obligation (e.g.,
disclosure)
3.4(d) Failing diligently to comply with discovery
3.4(e) Alluding to irrelevant matter/personal opinion at trial
3.4(f) Requesting a witness not to cooperate with the
adversary
3.5(b) Participating in ex parte communications
3.6 Trial publicity
3.8(a) Charging without probable cause
3.8(b) Protecting defendants' right to counsel
3.8(c) Seeking waiver of rights from unrepresented clients
3.8(d)_ Disclosing evidence
3.8(e) Preventing publicity by other personnel
3.8(f) Issuing attorney-subpoenas
3.8(g) Making extrajudicial statements
4.1(a) Making false statements to third persons
4.2 Contacting represented persons
4.3 Misleading unrepresented persons
4.4 Respecting the rights of third persons
5.1(a) Assuring that subordinates conform to the codes
8.2 Making false and reckless statements about judges or
candidates
8.3 Reporting misconduct of other lawyers
8.4 Catch-all
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Table V narrows Table IV's provisions to those which one would
expect prosecutors to violate more frequently, based on conduct that
the case law and common experience suggest occurs on a regular
basis.7 ° Thus, for example, one would not expect prosecutors to try to
act incompetently and one would expect those who do to be fired.7 1
The context in which prosecutors practice, including the availability
of internal supervision, help prevent incompetent performance.72
Likewise, because the rules for subsequent employment of
government lawyers are fairly clear,73 one would expect both
prosecutors leaving government and firms hiring them to accept the
guidance the rules provide. In neither of these areas does it seem
likely that many code violations will occur nor that, even if violations
are attempted, the intervention of disciplinary authorities will be
needed to correct them.
Prosecutors also are fairly unlikely to violate some of the other
provisions in Table IV because of their need to maintain an ongoing
professional relationship with judges before whom they appear
routinely. For example, prosecutors are less apt to hide controlling
authority than lawyers who appear only occasionally in court. Such
conduct will, if it becomes known, irreparably damage a prosecutor's
relationship with the court. Perhaps more significantly, if the conduct
becomes known to disciplinary agencies, it will also have become
known to the pertinent judge. One can be reasonably certain that the
judge will take strong remedial measures on his or her own.74
70. Providing a catalogue of constitutional cases involving the variety of recurring
prosecutorial misconduct cases is beyond the scope of this Article. A thorough collection
is found in GERSHMAN, supra note 4, passim.
71. There are a few cases in which prosecutors have been disciplined for
incompetence. But these are mostly older cases that predated the professionalization of
prosecution offices and arose at a time when courts were more willing to intervene in the
management of prosecutorial affairs. See authorities cited infra note 95.
72. See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
73. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 207 (1994) (imposing restrictions on post-government
practice by government attorneys); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.11 (1999)
(governing conflicts of interest on the part of government attorneys). I do not mean to
suggest that lawyers and third parties will always adhere to clear rules. In this context,
however, government lawyers and potential lawyers have little incentive to violate the
employment rules, given the availability of alternative jobs and employees. They
therefore will violate the rules only when they do not understand what the rules require.
74. One could, of course, make the same argument with respect to the offering of
false evidence, obstructing access to evidence, failing to make required disclosures, and
the like. For these actions, however, the prosecutor's incentives are somewhat different.
The conduct is less likely to be discovered, may be more important to victory, and,
because there is often an argument that the prohibition is not being violated, the
prosecutor typically can rationalize the conduct more easily.
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Once one accounts for the category of regulation that
prosecutors are unlikely to violate frequently and for those
controversial provisions that are subject to litigation,75 Table V
becomes consistent with the analysis of Table Il1. That analysis
suggested that the most likely candidates for discipline include
specifically proscribed pretrial and trial conduct, violations of pretrial
publicity rules, and prosecutors' failure to implement their obligations
to report other lawyers.76 Table V similarly suggests that the best
candidates for discipline involve pretrial and trial misconduct that is
directly prohibited by the rules.
75. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing litigation concerning
prosecutorial defiance of Model Rule 4.2). Among the most controversial prohibitions
that the professional codes arguably incorporate are rules against prosecutorial
communication with represented persons, engaging in misrepresentations in the
interrogation process, and misleading unrepresented witnesses and third parties into
cooperating. See MODEL RuLES OF PROF'L CONDuCr R. 4.1-4.3 (1999).
76. See supra text accompanying notes 68-69.
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TABLE V
Likely Candidates for Discipline
Rules Mainly Applicable to the Investigative Stage
Mileadingunr~presented persons







.pplicable to the Pretrial Stage
Knowingly disobeying a legal obligation (e.g.,
disclosure)
Failing diligently to comply with discovery
Requesting a witness not to cooperate with the
adversary
Not seeking a waiver of rights
Disclosing evidence
Rules Mainly Applicable to the Trial Stage
Making nonmeritorious claims
Making false statements to tribunal
Offering false evidence
Obstructing access to or unlawfully concealing
evidence
Falsi g evidee counseling a witness tc
testify falsely, offering a witness prohibitec
inducements
Afluding to irrelevant matter/personal opinion at
trial
Miscellaneous Provisions










II. THE LIMITED DISCIPLINE OF PROSECUTORS
There are several ways one might evaluate the professional
discipline of prosecutors empirically. Ideally, one could simply
interpret statistics collected by the various disciplinary agencies.
Surprisingly, however, not a single statistical compilation has ever
been published that collects information governing the discipline of
prosecutors or that compares the discipline of prosecutors to the
discipline of private practitioners.
Another option would be to conduct a rigorous independent
study of prosecutors' offices and disciplinary agencies. With adequate
resources, one could observe prosecutors and interview participants
in criminal cases in an effort to identify misconduct prosecutors
actually engage in and the resulting consequences. Similarly, one
might interview disciplinary counsel to ascertain what kinds of
prosecutorial misconduct they learn about (and how), to identify how
they decide to pursue or decline to pursue cases, and to evaluate the
results of cases that they have pursued. Again, probably because of
the resource intensiveness of these methodologies, neither approach
has ever been implemented.
77
This Article employs a third methodology, using resources that
are readily available in an effort to provide at least some of the
missing pieces of information. It examines the reported cases in
which prosecutors actually have been disciplined. As a scientific
matter, this methodology has shortcomings. The data are limited by
what is in the public record.78 Any inferences we might draw from the
raw results are subject to alternative interpretations, particularly
because the cases tell us nothing directly about the regulators' mental
processes in deciding whether or not to act. Still, the legal realist
would suggest that these are the data that count. They provide useful
insights into whether and when the regulators have seen fit to act.79
77. Such studies also run the risk of subjectivity. Data produced by interviews
sometimes are skewed and observations depend on the skill of the observer.
78. This excludes cases that have been instituted but dismissed, instances of private
discipline, and cases that otherwise do not enter the national reports. By definition, the
cases are limited to those in which regulatory agencies have learned of at least arguable
prosecutorial misconduct. Furthermore, they involve instances in which the regulators
have, in fact, taken action.
79. Even here, it is important to note one caveat. Because the reported cases do not
include dismissals and cases resulting in private discipline, the picture they present is not
complete.
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A. The Actual Discipline of Prosecutors
The study pulls together all reported cases in which prosecutors
have been disciplined for violations of professional rules by courts or
state disciplinary authorities.80 It includes all forms of professional
discipline, setting aside the subjective question of whether particular
sanctions in particular cases may have constituted merely a "slap on
the wrist.
81
The study, though not all-encompassing, " revealed over 100
cases in which prosecutors have been disciplined.83 This result dispels
at least one myth: that prosecutors are never disciplined.
Nevertheless, many of the cases are old, making the number of
reported cases far from staggering in light of the many prosecutors
80. The research for all parts of the study was conducted by research assistants. I
instructed them to search Westlaw and Lexis for all reported cases in which prosecutors
have been disciplined. I also instructed them to identify only cases involving professional
discipline of lawyers, eliminating cases that may have alluded to alleged prosecutorial
misconduct in the context of constitutional issues, sanction proceedings, contempt
proceedings, or the like. This limitation was consistent with this Article's goal of exploring
the viability of professional discipline as a (or the) primary vehicle for controlling
prosecutorial misconduct.
81. Some commentators who have criticized the lack of prosecutorial discipline have
rested their conclusions, in part, on the claim that private reprimands, and even public
censure, are inadequate sanctions for misconduct. See, e.g., Green, supra note 3, at 88-89
(arguing that private sanctions fail to deter prosecutorial misconduct). As with the
discipline of private lawyers, the remedy upon a finding of misconduct depends on a
variety of factors. The reaction of lawyers to censures that do not suspend their licenses to
practice will vary, depending on the lawyer and the context in which the censure is
imposed. For purposes of this Article's analysis, I choose not to enter this thicket,
addressing instead the question of whether the instances of prosecutorial discipline-
whatever the ultimate sanction-are too rare.
82. The comprehensiveness of this computerized search was, of course, limited both
by the search methods and commands employed by the research assistants and by the
limitations of the databases. Moreover, some professional discipline occurs through
unpublished opinions and through tribunals that are not reported through the "ALL
STATES" databases. For example, opinions of California's "bar courts" are separately
catalogued. Most jurisdictions report instances of discipline that do not produce judicial
opinions mainly through local periodicals, rather than the national reporters. Thus, I do
not pretend to claim that the empirical research upon which this Article relies is
comprehensive. Nevertheless, it does provide a useful starting point for discussion.
83. The results were presented to me in the form of a thirty-five page memorandum
encompassing over 100 cases. See Memorandum from Victoria Shank, to Fred Zacharias
(July 22, 1999) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). As I identified additional
cases that the author of the memorandum had not located, I added them to the list. For
earlier published collections of prosecutorial discipline cases, see Steele, supra note 4, at
970-79; Romualdo P. Eclavea, Annotation, Disciplinary Action Against Attorney for
Misconduct Related to Performance of Official Duties as Prosecuting Attorney, 10 A.L.R.
4th 605 passim (1981). Of course, more instances of prosecutorial discipline probably
exist, but did not give rise to judicial opinions published in the national reporters.
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and criminal cases that exist. Still, the body of cases is not entirely
negligible.' 4 The research suggests at least that, in appropriate cases,
courts and disciplinary organizations sometimes have been willing to
address prosecutorial misconduct.
After categorizing the cases,85 patterns emerge. Two categories
of conduct dominate the list. The first category involves plainly
illegal activity such as bribery,8 6 extortion,87 conversion,s and
84. I do not wish to quibble here. A reasonable observer could conclude that the
number of reported cases is "negligible" in light of the large number of criminal cases that
involve prosecutors. Moreover, the search covered a long period. No one could
reasonably dispute that, viewed over time, the occurrence of discipline is rare. See infra
note 116 and accompanying text.
85. As discussed below, research assistants reviewed selected prosecutorial discipline
cases in a different manner for different parts of the study. See infra note 107 and
accompanying text. The work of all the research assistants was excellent; their parallel
work confirmed that each student found most of the pertinent cases. However, on
occasion, one student found a few cases that others did not. In an effort to be as
comprehensive as possible, this section of the Article incorporates cases not in the first
research assistant's memorandum that subsequent students found. Likewise, Table VII
includes cases from this student's memorandum that fit within the categories in the Table.
86. See, e.g., In re Wilson, 258 P.2d 433, 436-37 (Ariz. 1953) (per curiam) (county
attorney disbarred for accepting money not to prosecute a prostitute); In re Cowdery, 10
P. 47, 65-66 (Cal. 1886) (en banc) (outgoing city attorney suspended for accepting bribe to
refrain from informing the new city attorney of precedent adverse to the adversary); In re
Norris, 57 P. 528, 531 (Kan. 1899) (prosecutor disbarred for accepting bribes for dismissing
and commencing prosecutions); Commonwealth ex reL Pike County Bar Ass'n v. Stump,
57 S.W.2d 524,527-28 (Ky. 1933) (prosecutor disbarred for accepting bribe to discontinue
investigation of a theft); In re Robinson, 420 N.Y.S.2d 430, 432 (App. Div. 1979) (per
curiam) (Assistant United States Attorney disbarred for providing confidential
information on pending cases to supposed members of organized crime for $700); In re
Crum, 215 N.W. 682, 687-89 (N.D. 1927) (Assistant Attorney General suspended for
accepting campaign contributions from persons under investigation); In re Simpson, 192 P.
1097, 1098-99 (Okla. 1920) (county attorney disbarred for accepting bribes to forgo
prosecution of gambling houses); In re McMahon, 513 P.2d 796, 798 (Or. 1973) (en banc,
per curiam) (city attorney suspended for accepting money and gifts from a bail
bondsman); State v. Hays, 61 S.E. 355, 357-58 (W. Va. 1908) (county attorney disbarred
for receiving periodic payments from the owner of a "speak-easy" to avoid prosecution for
violation of prohibition).
87. See, e.g., In re Bloom, 561 P.2d 258, 259-61 (Cal. 1977) (county counsel disbarred
for offering to make "problems disappear" in land development matter in exchange for
money); People ex reL Colo. Bar Ass'n v. Anglim, 78 P. 687, 687-88 (Colo. 1904) (district
attorney disbarred for demanding payments to forgo prosecuting saloon and gambling
shop proprietors).
88. See, e.g., People ex rel. Colo. Bar Ass'n v. Anonymous, Attorney at Law, 9 P.2d
611, 612 (Colo. 1932) (en banc) (district attorney reprimanded for billing city for
unincurred expenses and keeping the funds); In re Redding, 501 S.E.2d 499, 500-01 (Ga.
1998) (per curiam) (assistant solicitor general disbarred for converting funds tendered by
defendants for pleas in absentia); In re Forbes, 257 N.W. 329, 330 (Minn. 1934) (per
curiam) (county attorney disbarred for submitting falsified receipts for expenditures); In re
Jelliff, 271 N.W.2d 588, 589-91 (N.D. 1978) (prosecutor suspended for sixty days for failing
to account for funds he received while acting in his official capacity); In re Sitton, 177 P.
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embezzlement 9 of state fundsY0 The second category involves
procedural and evidentiary misconduct, such as withholding
evidence, 91 presenting false evidence,9 and misleading or deceiving
555, 556-57 (Okla. 1918) (county attorney reprimanded for converting county funds as
payment of moneys the county owed him independently); State ex rel McCourt v.
Garland, 150 P. 289, 290 (Or. 1915) (en bane) (special prosecutor disbarred for converting
$702 collected on behalf of the state); In re Jacquith, 270 N.W. 649, 650-51 (S.D. 1936)
(per curiam) (state's attorney suspended for six months for seeking excessive
reimbursement for mileage); In re Waggoner, 206 N.W. 427, 428-30 (S.D. 1925) (state's
attorney disbarred for conspiring with the sheriff to claim a reward for the return of stolen
property).
89. See, e.g., People v. Tucker, 676 P.2d 680, 681 (Colo. 1983) (en banc) (district
attorney suspended for one-year and a day for embezzling public funds); cf. In re Riddle,
700 N.E.2d 788, 792-96 (Ind. 1998) (per curiam) (prosecutor disbarred for hiring a "sham"
prosecutor, for purposes of staffing his private law office).
90. Cases involving miscellaneous other criminal conduct also exist. See, e.g., In re
Crisel, 461 N.E.2d 994, 995-96, 999 (Ill. 1984) (state's attorney suspended for three years
for filing a false police report); In re Armentrout, 457 N.E.2d 1262, 1268-69 (Ill. 1983)
(state's attorney suspended for two years for using his position to participate and induce
others to participate in creating forged petition signatures); In re Farr, 557 A.2d 1373, 1377
(N.J. 1989) (per curiam) (prosecutor's suspension continued for six months for theft of
evidence and other prosecutorial misconduct); D'Arcy v. N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, 374
N.Y.S.2d 222,223-24 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975) (per curiam) (district attorney disbarred after
pleading guilty to unlawful imprisonment in the course of his official duties); State ex. rel.
Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Scanland, 475 P.2d 373, 374-75 (Okla. 1970) (district attorney disbarred
for bribing a police officer); see also In re Chancey, No. 91 CH 348, Ill. S. Ct. MR No.
10266 (1994) (prosecutor reprimanded for creating fake court order to protect a child from
kidnapping), in Mary Robinson, Discipline Cases Involving Conduct by Criminal Defense
Attorneys and Prosecutors 4 (23rd National Conference on Professional Responsibility,
May 29-31, 1997) (on file with the author); In re Peek, No. 94 SH 0369, Ill. S. Ct. MR No.
9461 (1996) (prosecutor disbarred for conspiracy to purchase drugs), reported in
Robinson, supra, at 5.
91. See, e.g., Comm. on Prof l Ethics & Conduct of Iowa State Bar Ass'n v. Ramey,
512 N.W.2d 569, 572 (Iowa 1994) (en banc) (prosecutor suspended for three months for,
inter alia, failing to disclose interview with informant); In re Carpenter, 808 P.2d 1341,
1346 (Kan. 1991) (per curiam) (assistant district attorney censured for failure to disclose
exculpatory evidence); In re Morris, 419 N.W.2d 70,70 (Minn. 1987) (prosecutor censured
for failure to disclose evidence); In re Brophy, 442 N.Y.S.2d 818, 819 (N.Y App. Div. 1981)
(mem.) (prosecutor censured for inadvertent Brady violation); Office of Disciplinary
Counsel v. Jones, 613 N.E.2d 178, 179-80 (Ohio 1993) (per curiam) (prosecutor suspended
for six months for failing to disclose evidence); Cuyahoga County Bar Ass'n v.
Gerstenslager, 543 N.E.2d 491, 491 (Ohio 1989) (per curiam) (prosecutor publicly
reprimanded for Brady violation); In re Illuzzi, 632 A.2d 346, 347 (Vt. 1993) (per curiam)
(prosecutor privately reprimanded for failing to disclose exculpatory evidence); cf Read v.
Va. State Bar, 357 S.E.2d 544, 546-47 (Va. 1987) (commonwealth attorney not disciplined
for alleged Brady violation).
92. See, e.g., Price v. State Bar, 638 P.2d 1311, 1316, 1318 (Cal. 1982) (in banc)
(assistant district attorney suspended for five years for altering evidence); In re Dreiband,
77 N.Y.S.2d 585, 585 (N.Y. App. Div. 1948) (per curiam) (attorney suspended for arguing
false evidence); cf. In re Friedman, 392 N.E.2d 1333, 1338 (Ill. 1979) (prosecutor not
disciplined for creating and introducing false evidence in the process of developing a
bribery investigation); Grievance Committee's Findings re Prosecution of the Miller
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the tribunal.93 A third relatively large category involves allegedly
abusive behavior toward tribunals, usually consisting of criticism of
judges.94 Several other categories contain a significant, but smaller
Murder Case, 56 ILL. B.J. 955, 956 (1968) (describing committee's decision not to proceed
with disciplinary action against a prosecutor alleged to have used false evidence on
grounds that the court alleging the misconduct had "misapprehended the fact").
93. See, e.g., In re Hansen, 877 P.2d 802, 804, 806 (Ariz. 1994) (city prosecutor
censured for lying to the court about the reasons for a witness's absence); Ramey, 512
N.W.2d at 572 (prosecutor suspended for three months for, inter alia, making false
representations to a court); In re Joyce, 234 N.W. 9, 10 (Minn. 1930) (per curiam) (county
attorney suspended for six months for misrepresenting to the court the status of another
proceeding); In re Maestretti, 93 P. 1004, 1005 (Nev. 1908) (per curiam) (district attorney
suspended for thirty days for misleading the trial court about a recent opinion of the state
supreme court); In re Norton & Kress, 608 A.2d 328, 338-39 (N.J. 1992) (per curiam)
(prosecutor suspended for three months for withholding information from the court);
Mitchell v. Ass'n of the Bar of N.Y., 351 N.E.2d 743, 744-46 (N.Y. 1976) (United States
Attorney disbarred for perjury and obstruction of justice in connection with the Watergate
break-in); In re Drieband, 77 N.Y.S.2d 585, 585 (N.Y. App. Div. 1948) (assistant district
attorney censured for using testimony in summation that he had learned was false
subsequent to the testimony); In re Barnes, 574 P.2d 657, 659 (Or. 1978) (en banc) (district
attorney reprimanded for failing to inform a court issuing a warrant of a pending case on a
pertinent legal issue); In re Bridge, 724 A.2d 462, 463 (Vt. 1998) (Assistant Attorney
General reprimanded for misleading the court about government's consent to his
representation of a private client); In re Jones, 39 A. 1087,1090 (Vt. 1898) (state's attorney
disbarred for misleading presiding judge about the faithful performance of his duties,
which was a prerequisite to the payment of his salary); In re Sanders, 494 N.W.2d 430,
431-32 (Wis. 1993) (prosecutor suspended for sixty days for misrepresenting to scheduling
clerk that case had settled and misrepresenting facts to defense counsel and to court
concerning jail policy on work release); cf. United States v. Kelly, 550 F. Supp. 901, 902
(D. Mass. 1982) (mer.) (Assistant United States Attorney not disciplined for introducing
false testimony because prosecutor did not know the evidence was false).
94. See, e.g., In re Riley, 691 P.2d 695, 703-04, 707 (Ariz. 1984) (en banc) (deputy
county attorney censured for making derogatory public statements about a judge); In re
McCowan, 170 P. 1101, 1104 (Cal. 1917) (per curiam, en bane) (district attorney suspended
for stating to the grand jury that a judge was "nothing but a crook"); In re Raggio, 487
P.2d 499, 500-01 (Nev. 1971) (per curiam) (district attorney reprimanded for criticizing a
decision of the state supreme court in a television interview); In re Holtzman, 577 N.E.2d
30, 33 (N.Y. 1991) (per curiam) (district attorney reprimanded for repeating
unsubstantiated rumor about a judge); In re Becker, 203 N.Y.S. 437, 441-42 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1924) (assistant district attorney suspended for three months for, inter alia, making
inconsistent statements to the court about the existence of material in his file); In re
Markewich, 182 N.Y.S. 653, 656-57 (N.Y. App. Div. 1920) (assistant district attorney
censured for calling federal district judge's decision dishonest); cf In re Westfall, 808
S.W.2d 829, 838-39 (Mo. 1991) (en banc) (prosecutor not disciplined for criticizing a
decision).
Many of these decisions are of the older variety, probably in part because modern
First Amendment decisions might render discipline in some of these cases
unconstitutional. See Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality H: Is Confidentiality
Constitutional?, 75 IOWA L. REV. 601, 628-30 & nn.138-45 (1990) (discussing the
vulnerability of some professional regulation, including regulation of lawyer criticism of
judges, to First Amendment attack).
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number, of cases-including neglect of duty (incompetence),95 abuse
of authority for personal gain,96 conflicts of interest in private
practice,97 and engaging in ex parte communications.8 Other ethical
violations have been prosecuted on a haphazard basis.9
95. See, e.g., Wilbur v. Howard, 70 F. Supp. 930, 936-37 (E.D. Ky. 1947)
(commonwealth attorney disbarred for systematically failing to enforce laws against illegal
gaming), rev'd, 166 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1948); In re Miller, 677 N.E.2d 505, 509 (Ind. 1997)
(prosecutor admonished for failing repeatedly to comply with discovery requirements,
resulting in dismissal of the criminal case); In re Graves, 146 S.W.2d 555, 556 (Mo. 1941)
(en banc) (county attorney reprimanded for "failure to enforce the laws against gambling,
prostitution, illegal sale of intoxicating liquor... and failure to prosecute persons violating
election laws"); In re Segal, 617 A.2d 238, 245 (N.J. 1992) (per curiam) (prosecutor
reprimanded for failure to prepare a case); In re Voss, 90 N.W. 15, 15 (N.D. 1902) (state's
attorney suspended for nine months for intentionally failing to enforce prohibition and
gambling laws); In re Simpson, 83 N.W. 541, 552-53 (N.D. 1900) (state's attorney
disbarred for willfully failing to prosecute liquor laws); In re Burton, 246 P. 188, 200-01
(Utah 1926) (per curiam) (county attorney reprimanded for failing to prosecute a series of
cases); In re Wakefield, 177 A. 319, 323 (Vt. 1935) (state's attorney suspended for three
months for refusing to proceed against a private client); In re Lindberg, 494 N.W.2d 421,
424 (Wis. 1993) (per curiam) (district attorney suspended for six months for "continued
pattern of neglect" in his handling of cases).
96. See, e.g., People v. Brown, 726 P.2d 638, 641 (Colo. 1986) (en banc) (district
attorney disbarred for seeking to tamper with own motor vehicle record); In re Serstock,
432 N.W.2d 179, 185 (Minn. 1988) (en banc, per curiam) (prosecutor suspended
indefinitely, but for at least two years, for fixing traffic tickets of people to whom he was
indebted); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Greene, 655 N.E.2d 1299, 1301-02 (Ohio
1995) (prosecutor reprimanded for lying to the court to induce dismissal of traffic ticket
given to state trooper's wife); see also authorities cited supra notes 86-89.
97. See authorities cited supra notes 6-7.
98. See, e.g., United States v. Ferrara, 54 F.3d 825, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (challenge to
disciplinary proceedings in In re Howes, N. Mex. S. Ct. No. 23414, dismissed on procedural
grounds); In re Burrows, 629 P.2d 820, 826 (Or. 1981) (district attorney and assistant
district attorney reprimanded for consenting to meet directly with represented defendant);
In re Dumke, 489 N.W.2d 919, 922 (Wis. 1992) (city prosecutor suspended for six months
for discussing plea and possible cooperation directly with a represented party); In re Brey,
490 N.W.2d 15, 17 (Wis. 1992) (district attorney suspended for sixty days for discussing
plea and conduct of defense counsel with defendant); In re Zapf, 375 N.W.2d 654, 656
(Wis. 1985) (district attorney reprimanded for sending a letter directly to the defendant
without counsel's consent).
99. See, e.g., Noland v. State Bar, 405 P.2d 129, 132 (Cal. 1965) (assistant district
attorney suspended for thirty days for tampering with a jury list); People v. Buckley, 848
P.2d 353, 355 (Colo. 1993) (deputy district attorney censured for shoplifting); Fla. Bar v.
Schaub, 618 So. 2d 202, 204 (Fla. 1993) (prosecutor suspended for thirty days for eliciting
irrelevant testimony from defense experts); People ex reL Stead v. Phipps, 104 N.E. 144,
146 (Ill. 1914) (state's attorney suspended for one year for inducing three young boys to
plead guilty despite their assertions of innocence); In re Davis, 471 N.E.2d 280, 281 (Ind.
1984) (prosecutor reprimanded for failing to seek appointment of special prosecutor to
investigate criminal conduct of a colleague and his son); In re Berning, 468 N.E.2d 843, 845
(Ind. 1984) (prosecutor reprimanded for sending critical letters to jurors); State v.
Socolofsky, 666 P.2d 725, 727 (Kan. 1983) (county attorney censured for sending jurors a
newspaper article about defendant's previous misconduct); Commonwealth ex reL Ward v.
Harrington, 98 S.W.2d 53, 59 (Ky. 1936) (commonwealth attorney censured for presenting
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The breakdown of the cases-and in particular the nature of the
large categories of cases-is not surprising. One of the difficulties of
instituting investigations into potential ethical violations is that
disciplinary authorities typically depend on third parties to bring
violations to their attention. Prosecutors have no clients who are
likely to complain. Criminal defendants rarely have incentives or
resources to pursue complaints to the bar."° Defense lawyers hesitate
to antagonize adversaries with whom they must deal on a regular
basis. 10 1 As a result, one would expect most disciplinary proceedings
incomplete information to the grand jury); Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Green,
365 A.2d 39, 41 (Md. 1976) (state's attorney disbarred for his participation in obstruction
of justice, conspiracy, and attempted subornation of perjury); In re Shafir, 455 A.2d 1114,
1116 (NJ. 1983) (prosecutor reprimanded for forging supervisor's signature and giving
false information to another prosecutor's office); In re Weishoff, 382 A.2d 632, 636 (N.J.
1978) (prosecutor suspended for one year for creating charade in courtroom in order to
dispose of a case in the absence of the defendant or the complaining police officer); In re
Rook, 556 P.2d 1351, 1357 (Or. 1976) (district attorney reprimanded for refusing to plea
bargain with fifteen defendants on the same terms as with another defendant so long as
they were represented by either of two specific attorneys); In re Jacquith, 270 N.W. 649,
651 (S.D. 1937) (state's attorney suspended for six months for threatening a potential
witness to prevent his appearance); Zimmerman v. Bd. of Prof'l Responsibility, 764
S.W.2d 757, 760 (Tenn. 1989) (prosecutor reprimanded for making extrajudicial
statements in violation of the professional rules); In re McNerthney, 621 P.2d 731, 733
(Wash. 1980) (letter of admonition issued to prosecutor for inadvertently revealing the
existence of a search warrant to his roommate); see also In re Bretz, No. 96 CI 0117, Ill. S.
Ct. MR No. 12243, (district attorney suspended for filing charges without probable cause),
in Robinson, supra note 90, at 3; In re Garza, No. 86 CH 0021, Ill. S. Ct. MR No. 4206
(prosecutor censured for improper cross-examination and argument), reported in
Robinson, supra note 90, at 3; In re Bloon, Mass. Supreme Judicial Ct., No. 93-78 BD
(Dec. 16, 1993) (prosecutor censured for signing fraudulent confession to induce
confession by co-defendant), reported in Robinson, supra note 90, at 4; cf. Burkett v.
Chandler, 505 F.2d 217, 225 (10th Cir. 1974) (reversing disbarment of a United States
Attorney and several assistants based on an alleged conspiracy to violate the civil rights of
politician defendants and alleged hiding of a material exculpatory witness); People ex rel.
Hutchison v. Hickman, 128 N.E. 484, 488 (Ill. 1920) (district attorney not disciplined for
obtaining perjury indictment).
100. See Steele, supra note 4, at 980 ("[R]eporting the prosecutor to a grievance
committee does not serve the defendant's self-interests."). Typically, disciplinary agencies
will not entertain complaints against prosecutors until a criminal case is complete, on the
theory that, without this precaution, defendants will file complaints in order to obtain
discovery or otherwise benefit their positions in the underlying case. See infra note 130
and authorities cited therein.
As an empirical matter, defendants' lack of tactical incentives and resources may
not prevent embittered, incarcerated defendants from filing complaints continually,
hoping that the bar will investigate the prosecutor. However, as in the case of courts
evaluating the numerous prisoner filings challenging convictions, one would expect the bar
to view such complaints with suspicion. Absent an independent reason to believe the
complaint has merit, the disciplinary authorities are likely to give the complaints short
shrift.
101. Defense attorneys commonly allege prosecutorial misconduct in motions, but that
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to involve conduct that the regulators learn about through persons
other than the direct participants in the underlying case.
The category encompassing proven illegal conduct by
prosecutors consists of precisely the kind of cases that typically come
to the attention of disciplinary authorities without effort, through
media attention directed at the prosecutorial conduct."° Similarly,
cases in which the presentation of false evidence is discovered and
cases involving abusive litigation behavior-though rare in absolute
terms-at least come to the attention of a court. Judges are in a good
position to refer violations to the bar. Even when they are not
inclined to refer cases directly, judges may prompt bar action by
highlighting the misconduct in published opinions.
B. The Discipline of Prosecutors Relative to Private Attorneys
In order to evaluate whether the discipline of prosecutors is too
rare, it makes sense to compare its frequency against the frequency of
discipline of nonprosecutors. Table VI facilitates this analysis by
categorizing the code provisions listed in Table V into (1) those
applicable to all lawyers and (2) those that only prosecutors are likely
to violate or that prosecutors have more reason to violate than
private attorneys.10 3
is different than taking the more personal step of filing a bar grievance that has no
connection with the defense attorney's responsibilities in the litigation. See, e.g., Rosen,
supra note 3, at 735 ("Sensible defense attorneys will ... understandably hesitate to
jeopardize a practice by filing complaints that will have little chance of resulting in the
meaningful discipline, might harm their clients, and might well adversely affect their
practices .... "); Steele, supra note 4, at 980 (noting the disincentives of defense counsel to
report prosecutors). Indeed, even private lawyers hesitate to report code violations of
other private lawyers.
102. For some crimes by prosecutors, there may be victims who will want satisfaction
greater than merely seeing an offending prosecutor fired from his position. Especially
when no criminal charge is forthcoming, these victims may be willing to undertake the
burden of bringing the offense to the bar's attention by filing a bar complaint.
103. Thus, for example, the provisions of Model Rule 3.8 specifically target
prosecutorial conduct. In contrast, the provisions of Model Rule 3.4 impose discovery and
other procedural obligations that apply to all lawyers but which have special significance
for prosecutors because of prosecutors' constitutionally-based disclosure obligations.
Similarly, the provisions of Model Rules 4.3 and 4.4, which require all lawyers to respect
the right of third parties, seem especially significant for prosecutors because of the





Applicability of Table V's Provisions












Obstructing access to or unlawfully concealing
evidence
Falsifying evidence, counseling a witness to
testify falsely, offering a witness prohibited
inducements
Alluding to irrelevant matter/personal opinion at
trial
Requesting a witness not to cooperate with the
adversary
Encouraging publicity during litigation





Knowingly disobeying a legal obligation- (e.'g.,
disclosure) and failing to comply with discovery"
Not seeking a waiver of rights
Disclosing of evidence
Misleading unrepresented persons and
respecting the rights of third persons15
104. Model Rule 3.4 applies to private attorneys. However, the nature of prosecutors'
special constitutional responsibilities-especially the responsibility to disclose exculpatory
evidence-makes the requirements of Rule 3.4(c) and (d) particularly germane to
prosecutorial activity.
105. Prosecutors are more likely than private attorneys to require the cooperation of
unrepresented defendants or third-party witnesses and to be in a position to threaten a
clearly defined right those persons may possess.
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In an attempt to get a realistic handle on the facts concerning
discipline of prosecutors, I collected the reported cases in which states
had disciplined lawyers for violations of the rules listed in Table VI,
or their analogues.1°6 Although the research cannot be classified as
scientific or comprehensive,"° the results nonetheless are instructive.
Table VII classifies the results.' 8 For each provision, Table VII
notes the number of cases in which discipline has been imposed in
toto and then subdivides these into cases involving prosecutors,
criminal defense attorneys, and civil lawyers. Because many of the
instances of discipline involve lawyers' violations of multiple rules,
Table VII first identifies cases involving only violations of the
pertinent provisions and then lists separately the cases in which
multiple violations contributed to the disciplinary authorities'
findings. Again, Table VII does not distinguish among cases
according to the sanctions imposed.' 9
106. To be more precise, I asked several research assistants to conduct computerized
searches for these cases. In the interest of completeness, I supplemented their research
with cases found by research assistants working on other aspects of this study. See supra
note 85.
107. See supra notes 79-82. The Model Rules themselves do not govern in any state.
The research assistants, through the use of pointed computerized searches, attempted to
identify violations of state versions of rules that corresponded to each Model Rule in
question. Some instances of discipline predated the Rules but implemented the same
principles.
The task was complicated by the fact that individual states use their own
terminology and numbering for the concepts the rules embrace. For time reasons, the
research assistants could not identify each state's rules and then conduct searches using
those. Instead, the research assistants attempted more global searches using combined
state databases and key words to identify, as well as possible, all cases in which disciplinary
authorities attempted to or in fact meted out discipline to lawyers for violations of the
rules.
108. The cases listed in Table VII are simply too numerous to cite individually. The
research assistants' memoranda are on file with the author and the North Carolina Law
Review. The cases involving prosecutors are included in the summaries of prosecutor
discipline cases in Part II.A of this Article.




Discipline Cases Involving Table VI's Provisions
A. Provisions Applicable to Total # of Prosecutor Criminal Civil
All Lawyers Discipline Defense Lawyer
Cases Lawyer
3.1 5 0 0 5
3.1 + other violations 52 1 2 49
3.3(a)(1) 12 5 1 6
3.3(a)(1) + other violations 143 2 10 131
3.3(a)(4) 4 2 0 2
3.3(a)(4) + other violations 80 0 0 80
3.4(a) 3 0 2 1
3.4(a) + other violations 33 0 0 33
3.4(b) 1 0 1 0
3.4(b) + other violations 30 0 2 28
3.4(e) 1 1 0 0
3.4(e) + other violations 10 1 1 8
3.4(f) 5 1 1 3
3.4(0 + other violations 0 0 0 0
3.6/3.8(e), (g) 0 0 0 0
3.6/3.8(e), (g) + other violations 9 1 3 5
B,. Provisions Uniquely or
Specially Applicable to
Prosecutors,...
3.4(c) 0 0 0 0
3.4(c) + other violations1 1  20 0 0 20
3.4(d)/3.8(d) 112  8 8 0 0
3.4(d)/3.8(d) + other violations 18 2 0 16
3.8(c) 0 0 0 0
4.3 3 0 1 2
4.3 + other violations 26 0 2 24
4.4 8 2 0 6
4.4 + other violations 49 1 4 44
110. These categories are explained supra note 102.
111. The listed cases involve violations of court rules. In seventeen other cases,
lawyers were sanctioned for violating obligations imposed by disciplinary tribunals. Of
these, none involved a prosecutor and one involved criminal defense counsel.
112. In states with rules like Model Rule 3.8(d), which provides specific disclosure
obligations, prosecutors are more likely to be disciplined for violating ethical discovery
obligations than under the parallel provision of Model Rule 3.4(d). Table VII combines
the two rules.
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When one reviews the reported cases involving the provisions
equally applicable to prosecutors and private attorneys (i.e., the
provisions listed in Table VI Part A), a few surprising facts appear.
First, most discipline occurs in cases involving the private civil bar.
Discipline for lawyering in criminal cases-whether for violations by
prosecutors or defense attorneys-is quite rare.113  Apparently
because of the heightened sense of combat that occurs in the criminal
arena, disciplinary authorities are readier to adopt an "anything goes"
attitude.
Such leniency, of course, is consistent with the sense of many
commentators that criminal defense lawyers have a higher than
normal duty to press ethical boundaries to the limits when that is in
the interests of their clients."4 If disciplinary agencies are extending
the same reasoning to prosecutors, they probably are concluding
either that aggressive defense lawyer conduct justifies reciprocation
by prosecutors or that alternative remedies, such as judicial
supervision, are adequate to discourage prosecutorial misconduct.
There is another possible explanation. Quite apart from any
belief that alternative judicial remedies are adequate to control
misconduct in criminal cases, the disciplinary authorities may be leery
of interfering with, or having an undue effect upon, the judicial
process. If courts come to suspect that judicial decrees of
constitutional violations arising from prosecutorial misconduct or
defense counsel ineffectiveness automatically give rise to discipline-
even disbarment-the courts may become less willing to make
findings regarding misconduct. 115 Disciplinary authorities may be
recognizing this possibility and may be reacting by deferring to
judicial remedies in order to preserve their integrity.
113. Professor Albert W. Alschuler reached the same conclusion in 1972. Alschuler,
supra note 44, at 670 (referring to an earlier study showing "only a handful of cases" in
which disciplinary proceedings had been instituted against defense counsel for courtroom
behavior).
114. See generally Fred C. Zacharias, The Civil-Criminal Distinction in Professional
Responsibility, 7 J. CONTEMp. LEGAL ISSUES 165, 169-70 (1996) (discussing the general
acceptance of super-aggressive representation in criminal defense cases). Whether the
deference of discipliners is appropriate in this context is an issue beyond the scope of this
empirical analysis.
115. The hesitation to equate constitutional violations with grounds for other remedies
helps explain the judicial limits on malpractice suits by criminal defendants and immunity
rules barring civil suits against prosecutors. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS, § 75 cmt. d (Proposed Final Draft No. 2, Apr. 6, 1998) (noting
limits on malpractice suits against criminal defense counsel); see also infra notes 196-98
and accompanying text (discussing case law defining prosecutorial immunity).
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The second conclusion that one can reasonably draw from Table
VII is that discipline rarely occurs unless a lawyer has committed
multiple violations of the professional codes. Violation of a single
rule rarely suffices to produce bar action.
On the one hand, this conclusion should have little bearing on
the distinction between prosecutors and private lawyers for purposes
of discipline; prosecutors who commit multiple code violations should
theoretically be subject to the same likelihood of discipline as private
lawyers. On the other hand, prosecutors may, as a practical matter,
be less likely to commit multiple violations. When critics of
prosecutorial discipline complain of the failure of discipline, they
frequently are relying on the failure of the authorities to discipline
prosecutors who have committed single violations pointed out in the
judicial opinions. If, in fact, disciplinary authorities are reluctant to
prosecute any lawyer for single violations, the claim that disciplinary
authorities apply a double standard may be misplaced.
Nevertheless, on the whole, Table VII does support the claim
that prosecutors are disciplined rarely, both in the abstract and
relative to private lawyers." 6 Part A of Table VII concerns rules that
apply equally to prosecutors and private lawyers (though some do not
apply to private criminal defense attorneys) and which prosecutors,
like private attorneys, have incentives to violate. The Table suggests
that, even with respect to these limited provisions, the discrepancy
between discipline of prosecutors and private attorneys is enormous.
Part B addresses several rules that apply specially, or more
frequently, to prosecutors than to private attorneys. Still, the Table
reveals that prosecutors are disciplined no more often than are
private attorneys, and in some cases less. The study uncovered only
one category within either part of the Table-violations of the
discovery provisions in Rule 3.4(d)-in which a significant number of
prosecutorial violations resulted in discipline.
C. Explanations for the Discrepancy in Discipline
Several kinds of explanations might justify the discrepancy
between prosecutor discipline and private lawyer discipline. There
may be practical impediments to disciplining prosecutors or practical
reasons why disciplinary authorities prefer to pursue private
116. Accord Alschuler, supra note 44, at 670-71 (noting his inability to find more than
"a single case" in which prosecutors had been disciplined for courtroom misconduct); see
also JOSEPH F. LAWLESS, JR., PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 13.28, at 921-22 (1999)
(noting that discipline of prosecutors is rare); supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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misconduct. There may be theoretical or legal justifications for
avoiding the prosecution of prosecutors. Finally, alternative remedies
for prosecutorial misconduct may obviate the need for disciplinary
authorities to expend precious resources in pursuing the prosecution
corps.
117
1. Practical, Legal, and Theoretical Explanations
Disciplinary authorities have limited resources to prosecute
violations of the professional rules. They must determine how to
allocate those resources so as to punish misconduct most effectively,
deter future misconduct by the miscreant lawyer, protect the lawyer's
clients, deter misconduct by other lawyers, maintain the image of the
bar, and preserve the trust of potential clients."8
The context in which prosecutors practice helps insulate them
from discipline. Like practitioners in large law firms, prosecutors
typically are supervised and trained, have a peer support system
(including mentors and colleagues) through which ethical issues can
be discussed, and are blessed with the resources necessary to research
and come to a reasoned conclusion regarding appropriate conduct.
Historically, regulatory authorities have imposed discipline primarily
on solo or small-firm practitioners who are uncontrolled by such
internal constraints and are likelier to make "ethical decisions"
without measured and informed consideration." 9
117. See Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors, supra note 3, at 70-71 ("I would [argue]
that the criticism of formal disciplinary mechanisms overlooks the importance of informal
judicial controls, if not informal professional controls, to ensure compliance with standards
of prosecutorial conduct.").
118. See, e.g., Leslie C. Levin, The Emperor's Clothes and Other Tales About the
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Discipline Sanctions, 48 AM. U. L. REv. 1, 17-18 & nn.77-
81 (1998) ("Three reasons are typically cited for imposing discipline on lawyers: first and
foremost, protection of the public, second, protection of the administration of justice and
third, preservation of confidence in the legal profession."). The purposes of discipline
may, in the case of prosecutors, conflict. Discipline of prosecutors may, for example,
instill more confidence in the bar's willingness to regulate without a double standard but,
by bringing prosecutorial misconduct to light, may also engender doubts about the fairness
of the criminal justice system.
119. See, e.g., ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY
ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT
41 (Prelim. Draft, Jan. 15, 1970) ("The majority of complaints submitted to disciplinary
agencies concern the single or small-firm, low-income practitioner."); JEROME E. CARLIN,
LAWYERS' ETHICS: A SURVEY OF THE NEW YORK CITY BAR 52 (1966) (noting that low
status lawyers are more likely to accept just the minimum standards of conduct set by the
bar, while high status lawyers are more likely to accept higher standards); SHARON
TISHER ET AL., BRINGING THE BAR TO JUSTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SIX BAR
ASSOCIATIONS 103 (1977) ("[T]he vast majority of lawyers investigated and punished ...
practice alone or in two or three person firms .... "); James Evans, Lawyers at Risk,
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Similarly, disciplinary authorities tend to focus on intentional
misconduct by lawyers whose actions are self-serving or governed by
greed.1° Intentional misconduct is most harmful to the reputation of
the bar. When publicized, it heightens the public's inclination to
distrust, and to avoid the use of, lawyers as a whole. Such misconduct
also often reflects a lawyer who is likely to commit additional
violations, because the lawyer probably will continue to be influenced
by personal incentives unless taught a lesson.
When prosecutors have been influenced by venal incentives, the
record suggests that the bar has proceeded against them.' In
practice, however, prosecutors rarely have financial reasons to
commit misconduct.' More typically, prosecutors who engage in the
misconduct decried in the cases and literature-particularly pretrial
and trial misconduct-are driven by an excess of zeal in pursuing the
public good.'23  Prosecutors' actions based on such adversarial
motivations are unlikely to cause future private clients to avoid or
distrust their own lawyers. Indeed, excessive prosecutorial zeal
highlights for clients the importance of being well-represented. 24
Rightly or wrongly, the bar thus may feel less of a need to proceed
against the prosecutors."2
CALIF. LAW., Oct. 1989, at 45, 46-47 (noting that half of lawyers disciplined in California
are solo practitioners); OFFICE OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA CHIEF TRIAL
COUNSEL, CORRELATION OF FIRM SIZE AND PRACTICE AREA WITH COMPLAINTS
RECEIVED AND ACION TAKEN (July 1, 1994), in DEMOGRAPHIC AND PROFESSIONAL
CHARACTERISTICS OF CALIFORNIA ATrORNEYS 15, 23rd Nat'l Conf. on Prof.
Responsibility (May 29-31, 1997) (noting bar statistics to the effect that most complaints
focus on solo and small-firm practitioners). There is, of course another possible, but
highly controversial and unprovable explanation for the discrepancy in discipline.
Arguably, elite prosecutors' offices, like elite law firms, are able to hire the "best" lawyers
who may be either "more ethical" or more able to avoid ethical violations.
120. Cf. Levin, supra note 118, at 33 (noting the emphasis in ABA standards governing
lawyer discipline on lawyers' "dishonest or selfish motive").
121. See supra notes 86-89, 96 and accompanying text.
122. Cf. Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Constitutional Remedies, 77
WASH. U. L.Q. 713, 724 (1999) (discussing generally the problem of ascertaining
prosecutors' intentions).
123. In other words, the offending prosecutors typically engage in misconduct not for
reasons of personal gain, but because they are seeking to convict defendants they honestly
believe should be convicted. Although such misconduct may be improper in light of the
prosecutor's broad obligation to do overall justice, the misconduct occurs because of the
prosecutor's misunderstanding of the nature of that role. However wrongful the conduct
itself may be, the motivation seems less blameworthy than the motivation of private
attorneys who misbehave in order to feather their own nests.
124. In other words, the most obvious method for clients to counteract prosecutorial
zeal that manifests itself in misconduct is to retain and trust in aggressive defense counsel
who will monitor prosecutorial conduct closely.
125. Cf. In re Conduct of Lasswell, 673 P.2d 855, 860 (Or. 1983) (exonerating
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The absence of individual clients also reduces the likelihood of
professional discipline. When prosecutors stray, the regulators no
doubt perceive a lesser need to institute discipline in order to protect
individuals. 26 So long as alternative remedies, such as exclusionary
rules and appellate reversal of convictions, are sufficient to make
clear that the prosecutorial conduct is wrong and to discourage this
prosecutor and other prosecutors from committing future misconduct,
the disciplinary authorities may perceive little marginal benefit of
instituting their own proceedings.12 7 The disciplinary process cannot
help compensate or rectify the injuries of individual harmed
defendants."
More importantly, the absence of clients makes it far more
difficult for the authorities to learn of and prosecute violations. The
bar cannot rely on aggrieved defendants as the instigators of
complaints, because almost all defendants have antipathy toward
their prosecutors. If the bar routinely responds to complaints by
defendants, defense attorneys will be able to manipulate bar
proceedings for tactical purposes.29 Yet, to the extent the bar
successfully separates disciplinary proceedings from the underlying
prosecutions,30 defendants and their attorneys lose much of their
prosecutor of violating rule against extra-judicial statements on grounds that the
prosecutor lacked the requisite intent); In re McNerthney, 621 P.2d 731, 733 (Wash. 1980)
(reducing punishment to a letter of admonition where prosecutor's code violations were
well-intentioned and inadvertent).
126. Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors, supra note 3, at 89 (noting that disciplinary
authorities "generally seek to reserve resources for cases of the most egregious
wrongdoing. These are usually cases where lawyers harm individual clients .... ").
127. Of course, when disciplinary authorities perceive that the alternative remedies are
inadequate to deter, the implementation of discipline may provide marginal deterrence.
128. Disciplinary authorities typically have no authority to order any form of
compensation to victims or to intervene in the criminal process through which a
prosecutor may have injured a defendant.
129. Among the potential benefits are obtaining discovery, disqualifying the
prosecutor, and casting public (and jury) doubt about the prosecutor's credibility.
Moreover, at a minimum, disciplinary authorities have reason to fear that claims by
criminal defendants may be motivated by resentment for their prosecution, a desire for
vengeance, or a design to discredit the prosecutor's office. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM,
MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 13.10.2, at 761 (1986) (discussing hesitation of disciplinary
agencies to prosecute prosecutors).
130. Anecdotal evidence suggests that states respond in varying ways to complaints
filed in the middle of ongoing proceedings. In a recent discussion on a legal ethics internet
discussion group, participants familiar with the disciplinary process in particular
jurisdictions revealed the following information. See Responses to Subject "Disciplinary
Counsel Question" (Sept. 7, 1999), at http:/www.washlaw.edu/legalethics/archives/990801/
msgOO125.html (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). In Missouri and Ohio, "it is
common to defer investigation into a complaint when a complaint is filed against a lawyer
by opposing counsel or an opposing party in a pending case." Response by Peter Joy
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incentive to file and bear the burden of prosecuting complaints. 3 '
The practical consequence is that the bar must identify and prosecute
most violations on its own. Even relying on suggestions of
prosecutorial misconduct in judicial opinions can prove unrewarding,
for these suggestions sometimes have proven to be literary
exaggerations. 32
(Sept. 7, 1999), at http:/www.washlaw.edu/legalethics/archives/990801/msgOO125.html (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review). In California, "the Bar will 'turn their heads'
away from a complaint that looks like a petty dispute between opposing counsel. Usually
after the case settles, the complainant declines to follow-up." Response by Carol
Langford (Sept. 8, 1999), at http:/www.washlaw.edullegalethics/archives/990801/
msgOO125.html (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). In Virginia, the discipliners
"may, for exceptional circumstances, stay ... [a] hearing or investigation because the
issues are ... similar to those raised in a pending criminal ... proceeding. Normally,
however, the pendency of ... criminal proceedings is not a basis to defer the investigation
or hearing on a bar complaint." Response by James M. McCauley, Ethics Counsel,
Virginia State Bar (Sept. 8, 1999), at http:/www.washlaw.edullegalethics/archives/
990801/msg00125.html (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). In South Carolina,
there is no "rule or practice" of deferring complaints, but the Grievance Board appears to
"discount these types of complaints." Response by Steedley Bogan, former member of
Grievance Board (Sept. 7, 1999), at http:/www.washlaw.edullegalethicslarchives/990801/
msgOO125.html (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
131. As a factual matter, regardless of incentives, criminal defendants may still
routinely file complaints. They may feel particularly aggrieved and have a jaundiced view
of prosecutors' motives. Incarcerated complainants have plenty of time to pursue
complaints. They may view pursuing the process as a distracting amusement.
If true, these considerations cut in conflicting directions. The presence of the
complaints arguably bring instances of prosecutorial misconduct to bar attention. On the
other hand, if such complaints are routine, the bar may feel compelled to give them short
shrift. Cf. Bogan, supra note 130 (noting that the South Carolina Grievance Board
"discounts" complaints filed in the course of litigation). The bar's investigative resources
are limited. Moreover, pursuing meritless complaints, even if only to the stage of
determining that they are meritless, imposes a psychological and financial burden on the
falsely-accused prosecutors.
132. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1462 (9th Cir. 1993) (amending a
lower court's finding of misconduct on the basis that "the magistrate judge apparently did
not have a full understanding of the facts"). The limited available empirical evidence
concerning the quality of judicial findings is ambiguous. Professor Richard Rosen
reviewed nine disciplinary cases that stemmed from judicial decisions finding outrageous
prosecutorial misconduct. See Rosen, supra note 3, at 730. Three resulted in no discipline,
four resulted in minor sanctions stemming largely from the discipliners' disagreement with
the court about the severity of the misconduct, and two resulted in a finding of substantial
wrongdoing justifying a major sanction. See id. These figures can be used to support the
contradictory conclusions that courts which note misconduct exaggerate the existence of
disciplinable behavior, that accurate judicial findings of misconduct often are ignored by
disciplinary agencies, and that judicial findings of misconduct-when considered by
disciplinary agencies-often do translate into discipline.
Certainly, however, Professor Rosen is correct in his main observation. There are
many reported cases in which courts cite prosecutorial misconduct, but few reported cases
of discipline for the cited misconduct. Even assuming that some of the judicial findings are
exaggerated or refer to types of misconduct that would not justify professional discipline,
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Doubts about the substantive basis for imposing discipline also
may cause disciplinary authorities to hesitate to institute
proceedings-for practical and theoretical reasons. The authorities
must deal with the reality that many instances of questionable
prosecutorial zeal reflect a conscious effort by prosecutors to push the
legal envelope. Prosecutors rarely want to commit direct violations of
the law, because that may result in the loss of a conviction through
the exclusionary rule or on appeal. Prosecutors may, however,
attempt to salvage potentially losing cases by stretching their
authority or rationalizing police conduct. The result often is a new
legal argument regarding untested statutory or constitutional
principles, 133 which prosecutors' offices stand ready to litigate." 4
Disciplinary authorities who seek to base professional discipline on
such conduct must expect extensive litigation in which the legal issues
are fully vetted. As a practical matter, faced with no shortage of
other cases involving professional misconduct, the authorities may
prefer to use their limited resources to dispose of a greater number of
easier cases.135 As a substantive matter, the authorities may genuinely
one suspects that many others do identify disciplinable behavior. The paucity of ensuing
disciplinary cases suggests either that disciplinary agencies are not learning of the judicial
findings or are making a conscious decision not to follow up on them.
133. See Roger C. Cramton & Lisa K. Udell, State Ethics Rules and Federal
Prosecutors: The Controversies Over the Anti-Contact and Subpoena Rules, 53 U. PrT. L.
REv. 291, 387-88 (1992) (noting that the bar's vision of appropriate or justifiable conduct
may differ from that of prosecutors, the public, and the courts); Green, Policing Federal
Prosecutors, supra note 3, at 71-72 (noting that prosecutors often have a different
conception of their role than others in the organized bar and arguing that it is therefore
"important that authoritative rulings be issued regarding the scope of proper prosecutorial
conduct and that improper conduct be sanctioned").
134. See, e.g., United States v. Colo. Supreme Court, 189 F.3d 1281, 1283-89 (10th Cir.
1999) (rejecting federal challenge to state rule governing subpoenas to attorneys);
Whitehouse v. United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of R.I., 53 F.3d 1349, 1365-66 (1st
Cir. 1995) (upholding federal local court rule applying state ethics provision against
challenge by federal prosecutors); Baylson v. Disciplinary Bd., 975 F.2d 102, 106-07 (3d
Cir. 1992) (rejecting district court's authority to adopt a state rule limiting grand jury
subpoenas); United States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 664, 667 (1st Cir. 1987) (en banc) (per
curiam) (upholding federal local court rule applying state ethics provision against federal
prosecutors); Stern v. Supreme Judicial Court, 16 F. Supp. 2d 88, 89 (D. Mass. 1998), rev'd,
214 F.3d 4, 13-15 (1st Cir. 2000) (considering a challenge by a United States Attorney to a
state ethics rule regarding subpoenas to attorneys); In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 484-85
(D.N.M. 1992) (rejecting Supremacy Clause argument raised by government in challenge
to application of state ethics rule).
135. See, e.g., Cramton & Udell, supra note 133, at 305 (noting that "[f]ederal
prosecutors acting in good faith in accordance with plausible interpretations of ethics rules
are exceedingly unlikely to be disciplined"); Zacharias, Specificity in Professional
Responsibility Codes, supra note 49, at 280 ("[B]ecoming embroiled in disputes concerning




believe that the professional rules in question, though technically
applicable to prosecutors, should be enforced less vigorously.
1 36
Moreover, the authorities may sense a real separation of powers
issue. Ultimately, bar authorities in most jurisdictions operate under
the rubric of the courts.137 Prosecutors are members of the executive
branch. To the extent discipline requires an investigation of the
workings of a prosecutor's office, disciplinary agencies may consider
it invasive of the authority of a coordinate branch of government.38
On occasion, prosecutors have directly raised the claim that the
application of particular professional rules to them violates the
principle of separation of powers. 39
Even if the bar does not feel legally constrained, it may feel
politically constrained. State prosecutors, after all, are elected
officials. The conduct and zeal shown by their subordinates is subject
to political oversight. Prosecutorial misconduct can become a
campaign issue. 40 Disciplinary authorities may hesitate to institute
proceedings for fear of being accused of engaging in politics. They
may hesitate to call into question the quality of justice in the judicial
system . 41 At the same time, the authorities may have some
136. This possibility is discussed fully in Zacharias & Green, supra note 10, at 224-35
(discussing why prosecutors may be viewed differently than other attorneys for purposes
of professional discipline).
137. In most, but not all, states, the state supreme court is charged with promulgating
the professional rules and, ultimately, with hearing appeals in cases involving discipline.
138. See, e.g., Atwood, supra note 68, at 204-06 (discussing the separation of powers
argument); Zacharias & Green, supra note 10, at 240-42 ("Courts hesitate to supervise
prosecutorial conduct for fear of encroaching on the authority of another branch of
government.").
139. See, e.g., Whitehouse, 53 F.3d at 1365-66 (upholding a federal district court rule
applying state ethics provision despite a claim by federal prosecutors that the federal
district court rule would "alter the traditional relationships between prosecutor, court, and
grand jury"); United States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1461 (9th Cir. 1993) (requiring
prosecutorial compliance with California's no-contacts rule and affirming the district
court's rejection of the separation of powers argument at 765 F. Supp. 1433, 1445 (N.D.
Cal. 1991)); Klubock, 832 F.2d at 667 (upholding federal district court rule applying state
ethics provision despite separation of powers claim by federal prosecutors); Simpson v.
Ala. State Bar, 311 So. 2d 307, 310-11 (Ala. 1975) (holding that prosecutor could not be
disciplined where state constitution provided the method for prosecutor's removal);
Watson v. Ala. State Bar, 311 So. 2d 311, 311-12 (Ala. 1975) (same); see also Eclavea,
supra note 83, § 2(a) ("[Tjhere is authority supporting the view that misconduct
committed by a prosecuting attorney ... cannot serve as the basis for professional
disciplin[e] .... ).
140. See Zacharias, Plea Bargaining, supra note 55, at 1185-86 (discussing the benefit
of published prosecutorial standards on plea bargaining as exposing the standards to
political debate).
141. See Auler, supra note 41, at 646 ("Grievance committees ... are understandably
hesitant to take action against other state officials which will reveal injustice in the judicial
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confidence that excessive zeal is subject to rectification because of the
potential for media attention and public review.
Finally, there are timing issues related to parallel criminal
proceedings involving the alleged professional misconduct.
Disciplinary authorities may be loath to review a prosecutor's
conduct while appellate proceedings are pending, for fear of
interfering, or being perceived as interfering, in the appellate process.
Yet if disciplinary proceedings are held in abeyance until the
completion of the criminal proceedings, many years may pass.142
Moreover, career prosecutors are in the minority.143 Individual
prosecutors who commit misconduct may no longer be prosecutors by
the time the appeals of their cases are complete. In such cases, the
need for specific deterrence of the individual prosecutor's zeal will
have dissipated. Again, the bar has less incentive to proceed.
2. The Availability of Alternative Remedies
There are four categories of alternative remedies for
prosecutorial misconduct, the availability of which may encourage
disciplinary agencies to save their resources for other cases:
administrative supervision of prosecutors, trial court controls,
appellate court intervention, and public oversight. Not all of these
alternatives will be effective in every situation. Their drawbacks are
discussed in Part III. For purposes of this Part of the Article,
however, let us identify these remedies and how they operate.
Perhaps the most frequently implemented alternative mechanism
for controlling prosecutorial misconduct is internal office supervision.
This supervision takes three general forms: training and preparation
of prosecutors to avoid misconduct; routine supervisory control and
performance evaluation; and specific review of alleged misconduct.
In addition to the initial training of new prosecutors, many
agencies maintain manuals or guidelines governing recurring
prosecutorial conduct.144  Prosecutors tend to adhere to these
system.").
142. In contrast, civil cases involving the poorly-financed private lawyers who typically
are subjected to discipline may be less likely to be appealed, reducing the likelihood of
delay. See supra note 119 and accompanying text (discussing which lawyers are most
frequently disciplined).
143. This phenomenon may be changing somewhat. See Harvey Berkman, The Green
Cadre of U.S. Attorneys is Sporting Gray as Prosecutors Stay on the Job, NAT'L L.J., Aug.
15, 1994, at 1 (describing the increasing tendency of Assistant United States Attorneys to
remain on the job for longer terms).
144. See Zacharias, Plea Bargaining, supra note 55, at 1184 n.196 (discussing
administrative guidelines maintained by some prosecutors' offices); see also Green,
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regulations, not only because they provide needed guidance in
resolving ethical dilemmas, but because violations may serve as a
basis for internal discipline or poor performance evaluations.
Routine supervisory control includes the availability of
supervisors who offer advice to individual prosecutors in particular
potential misconduct situations. Probably more significant, however,
is the performance evaluation process. Allegations of misconduct
against individual prosecutors will be considered. 145 Their potential
effect on salaries and job retention is certain to be of importance to
prosecutors.
Investigation or review of specific alleged misconduct may take
two forms. It sometimes is undertaken internally or informally by the
prosecutor's superiors. Alternatively, in many offices and in the
federal government, specific units are responsible for the
investigation of misconduct. 46
Outside prosecutors' offices, the primary source of oversight is
the judicial process. Trial courts exercise control in a variety of ways.
Despite prosecutors' broad discretion in guiding grand juries,
complaints sometimes can make their way to the supervising judge.
Once a case is instituted, trial judges exercise control over
prosecutorial behavior through prosecutors' need to maintain a
working relationship with the court and through the courts' powers to
exclude evidence, to dismiss prosecutions, to hold prosecutors in
contempt, and-at least with respect to in-court conduct-to issue
orders in the exercise of the court's supervisory authority.14 7 In some
Policing Federal Prosecutors, supra note 3, at 76-77 (discussing internal guidelines
governing federal prosecutors); Little, supra note 28, at 744-45 (discussing the United
States Attorney's Manual and training program and the National District Attorneys
Association Ethics Manual).
145. See Cramton & Udell, supra note 133, at 305 n.41 ("Although it is stated that
[internal federal procedures for reviewing misconduct] rarely result in dismissal for the
offending lawyer, see H.R. Rep. No. 986, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 31-36 (1990), there are a
much larger number of instances in which internal criticism and admonishment serve to
set future standards of behavior.").
146. In the federal government, for example, the Department of Justice maintains an
independent Office of Professional Responsibility, which is charged with investigating
allegations of misconduct by federal prosecutors. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.39(a) (1999); see also
Auler, supra note 41, at 647 (discussing the potential for criminal prosecution of
prosecutors for prosecutorial misconduct); Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors, supra
note 3, at 84-87 (discussing the Office of Professional Responsibility, its authority, and its
weaknesses).
147. In United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992), the Supreme Court limited
judicial authority to exercise supervisory control over prosecutors to "in-court" conduct.
Id, at 46-47. Williams acknowledges, however, that courts have some authority over even
out-of-court conduct that affects judicial proceedings. Id at 46 (citing Bank of Nova
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isolated contexts, a court also may have authority to fine individual
prosecutors when it determines that a fine is necessary to deter
similar egregious conduct in the future." s
Appellate court authority over prosecutors is similar, though not
identical, to that of the trial courts. Appellate courts may reverse
and, in some rare instances, dismiss cases for prosecutorial
misconduct.149 Their primary authority, however, lies in their written
opinions-the ability to embarrass prosecutors by name when the
misconduct warrants this remedy.
50
Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250 (1988), a case upholding judicial power to dismiss an
indictment because of misconduct occurring before the grand jury). Williams left standing
a long line of cases in which courts have exercised supervisory authority over lawyers,
federal agents, and their own proceedings. See, e.g., United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S.
499, 505-06 (1983) (resting limited supervisory authority, inter alia, on power to preserve
the integrity of the judicial process); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966)
(imposing prophylactic rule of conduct for police officers); Jencks v. United States, 353
U.S. 657, 667-68 (1957) (finding inherent judicial power to control court procedures).
148. See, e.g., Greene v. State, 931 P.2d 54, 62 (Nev. 1997) (applying Superior Court
Rule 39, which gives courts the power to fine prosecutors for making improper remarks in
opening statement); McGuire v. State, 677 P.2d 1060, 1065 (Nev. 1984) ($500 fine imposed
on a prosecutor by the Nevada Supreme Court in a combined appeal of two defendants'
convictions). Generally, courts have no fining authority, except in contempt proceedings,
with respect to Rule 11 violations, or when specific statutory provisions providing for fines
exist. Cf. Candolfi v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 595 N.Y.S.2d 656, 660 (Civ. Ct. 1992)
(upholding $1,800 fine of civil attorney for "abusive behavior"); see also Levin, supra note
118, at 77-80 & nn.346-48 (discussing the use of fines in this and other countries and
advocating the creation of fining authority as part of disciplinary sanctions); Barrow, supra
note 3, at 328 (urging expanded judicial imposition of monetary sanctions for
inappropriate prosecutorial conduct).
149. A finding of prosecutorial misconduct typically will not dispel the possibility of
defendant's guilt, so appellate courts are unlikely to bar retrial of the defendant. Under
some limited circumstances, however, courts may rule that intentional egregious
misconduct at trial so subverted the integrity of the trial process that double jeopardy
considerations require dismissal with prejudice. See Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667,
675-76 (1982); see also Rick A. Bierschbach, One Bite at the Apple: Reversals of
Convictions Tainted by Prosecutorial Misconduct and the Ban on Double Jeopardy, 94
MICH. L. REV. 1346, 1348-51, 1363-69 & nn.117-18 (1996) (discussing double jeopardy
principles applicable to prosecutorial misconduct reversals); Rosenthal, supra note 4, at
910-26 (analyzing the application of double jeopardy principles to cases involving
prosecutorial misconduct).
150. See, e.g., McGuire v. State, 677 P.2d 1060, 1062 (Nev. 1984) (mentioning by name
a prosecutor who had committed similar misconduct in two other cases). But cf.
GERSHMAN, supra note 4, § 13.4, at 13-14 (noting that "[c]uriously, appellate courts have
been reluctant to identify the.., offending prosecutor by name," but citing cases in which
courts have done so).
Some prosecutors may not care if an appellate court mentions them by name as
having committed misconduct so long as the court does not impose any direct sanction.
Other prosecutors take great offense at any suggestion that they have acted improperly.
See, e.g., People v. Hill, 952 P.2d 673, 682-83 & n.9 (Cal. 1998) (mentioning prosecutor by
name and, over prosecutor's strenuous objection, alluding to unpublished previous
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The other main remedy for prosecutorial misconduct is public
oversight. State district attorneys typically are elected officials.
Misconduct within their offices-even by lawyers whom they have
not directly supervised-can become an issue during elections.
Accordingly, media attention and political review by the voters may
provide a deterrent or, at least, a reason for district attorneys to take
corrective steps when misconduct is brought to their attention.
III. SHOULD PROSECUTORS BE DISCIPLINED MORE OFIEN?
Thus far, we have examined the reality of prosecutor discipline,
identified areas in which there appears to be a discrepancy between
discipline of prosecutors and private attorneys, suggested possible
explanations for why disciplinary authorities sometimes hesitate to
bring cases against prosecutors, and noted the existence of alternative
remedies for prosecutorial misconduct. It behooves us to mesh some
of these analyses. In particular, let us consider when the discrepancy
in prosecutions seems appropriate and when the case for increased
discipline is at its strongest.
A. When Is Discipline Most Useful?
When disciplinary resources are limited, prosecutorial activity is
more hidden and less blameworthy than private misconduct, and
alternative remedies are available for prosecutors' violations of the
codes, it makes considerable sense for disciplinary authorities to
forebear. On the other hand, even conceding limitations on
disciplinary resources, these factors do not excuse complete
abdication of disciplinary authority. There are at least five varieties
of cases in which discipline seems especially important.
The first two varieties are defined by the nature of the
prosecutorial misconduct itself. When violations are particularly
serious and the prosecutors involved are unlikely to be punished by
other means, the bar's intervention may be required to maintain
society's confidence in the disciplinary system. The most obvious
opinions in which prosecutor's conduct also was chastised). Thus, for example, when a
district court in United States v. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. 1433 (N.D. Cal. 1991), mentioned a
specific Assistant United States Attorney as having improperly contacted a represented
party and as having materially misled the magistrate, the United States Attorney's office
immediately filed a brief demanding not only that the decision be reversed, but that the
description of the Assistant's alleged misconduct be removed from the public record. See
United States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1462 (9th Cir. 1993) (referring to the prosecutor's
contention that "the district court erred in its finding that Lyons materially misled the
magistrate judge" and noting "conflicts in the testimony" about this subject).
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examples are prosecutorial involvement in illegal conduct' and
intentional efforts by prosecutors to manufacture inculpatory
evidence or to hide exculpatory evidence. When offending
prosecutors are criminally prosecuted for such misconduct, society's
sense of justice is vindicated. However, when the prosecutors are
merely criticized or lose their employment but continue to practice
law, society may sense a double standard. It is probably for this
reason that the bar exercises its disciplinary authority most (although
still rarely) in these type of cases. 5 3
Likewise, when prosecutors engage in part-time private
employment and the rights of their private clients are affected, the
alternative public remedies for prosecutorial misconduct are unlikely
to address the private misconduct. Again, bar action is warranted.
For the most part, in this context, discipline occurs on a more regular
basis. 5 4
Beyond violations involving criminal conduct and the rights of
private clients, it is difficult to pinpoint violations that fit within the
"particularly serious" framework. One might consider intentional
misconduct, such as introducing false evidence 55 or knowingly
withholding exculpatory information,'56 as exceptional. On a case-by-
case analysis, however, seemingly less important violations may be
equally harmful to defendants and fair process. 7  Moreover,
intentional violations are those that prosecutors will be particularly
careful to hide. These will often evade the attention of disciplinary
agencies.
Perhaps, therefore, regulators should focus on a third, more
transparent group of violations; namely, violations that the
disciplinary agency knows or senses recur on a frequent basis.
Although disciplinary agencies may not learn of many individual
violations, for reasons we have already discussed, 58 the constitutional
151. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 8.4(b) (1999) ("It is professional
misconduct for a lawyer to ... commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer .... ").
152. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 86-93 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
155. See MODEL RULEs OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 3.3(a)(4) (1999) (forbidding lawyers
to "offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false").
156. See id R. 3.8(d) (requiring prosecutors to disclose Brady information and more).
157. In other words, withholding particular evidence may have little actual effect on a
case while other violations, such as blocking access to witnesses or misleading an
unrepresented witness into cooperating, can prove to be the difference between an
acquittal and a conviction.
158. See supra note 126-27 and accompanying text.
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case law suggests that a fair number (though perhaps a small
percentage) of prosecutors do introduce false evidence,'59 make false
statements to tribunals,16° withhold evidence, 16' and obstruct access to
witnesses.1 62 Perhaps it makes sense for the agency to treat a
prosecutor's office as one lawyer for purposes of determining whether
a pattern of code violations justifies discipline.163
As already noted, one could make a case for calling the
individual violations "particularly serious violations" that fit within
159. See, e.g., Davis v. Zant, 36 F.3d 1538, 1551 (11th Cir. 1994) (reversing conviction
because of prosecutor's false statement that misled jury regarding credibility of
government witness); United States v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315, 1323-24 (9th Cir. 1993)
(prosecutor's false statement regarding availability of witness constitutes reversible error);
United States v. Valentine, 820 F.2d 565, 570 (2d Cir. 1987) (prosecutor's
mischaracterization of grand jury testimony of uncalled witness violated due process); cf
People v. Rice, 505 N.E.2d 618, 619 (N.Y. 1987) (criticizing prosecutor's failure to advise
defense counsel that witness was dead, but declining to reverse).
160. See, e.g., Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959) (failure of prosecutor to
correct witness's false testimony constituted a due process violation); United States v.
Vozzella, 124 F.3d 389, 391-93 (2d Cir. 1997) (reversing lower court's decision because of
government's introduction of false records); United States v. Catton, 89 F.3d 387, 389 (7th
Cir. 1996) (prosecutor's misstatement of fact and false testimony of a witness required a
new trial); United States v. Tarricone, 11 F.3d 24 passim (2d Cir. 1993), superceded by 21
F.3d 474 (remanding to determine, inter alia, whether the prosecutor knew or should have
known of false testimony); see also Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1967) (reversal for
prosecutor's use of physical evidence that deliberately misrepresented the truth, and gave
false impression to the jury); Genson & Martin, supra note 1, at 50, n.65 (citing cases
involving prosecutors' misstatements of law).
161. For a discussion of cases involving the withholding of evidence, see GERSHMAN,
supra note 4, §§ 5.2-5.4 (discussing and citing cases involving prosecutorial suppression of
evidence potentially favorable to the accused).
162. See, e.g., United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 860-63 (1982) (noting
the possibility of a constitutional violation when defendant can show a prosecutor
removed a witness from the country to deprive the defense of an opportunity to interview
him); United States v. Mendez-Rodriguez, 450 F.2d 1, 4-5 (9th Cir. 1971) (prosecutor
arranged deportation of witness); Gregory v. United States, 369 F.2d 185, 188 (D.C. Cir.
1966) (forbidding prosecutors to directly advise witnesses not to speak with the defense);
People v. Avery, 377 N.E.2d 1271, 1276 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (reversing conviction where
prosecutor kept witness incommunicado); see also authorities cited in GERSHMAN, supra
note 4, § 9.10(b)(1)-(2).
163. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text. Disciplinary authorities routinely
take into account the existence, or absence of, a prior record of disciplinary offenses in
deciding whether to proceed and in imposing sanctions. See Levin, supra note 118, at 53-
54 (arguing against this practice). Because prosecutors often act in accordance with office
policy or office ethos, it is fair for the discipliners to consider the whole office in assessing
the track record, particularly if the reason the discipliner considers this factor at all is its
relevance to the need for deterrence. This reasoning may also justify regulators in
considering discipline of supervisors or in seeking the authority to impose "entity liability"
on the prosecutors' office. See infra note 191 and accompanying text; see also Fred C.
Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism and Client Interests, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1303, 1371, 1371-73 nn.239-40 & 243 (1995) [hereinafter Zacharias, Reconciling
Professionalism] (discussing the benefits of entity liability).
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the first set of cases in which discipline seems important. 164 Yet even
if the violations are not particularly serious when considered alone,
their recurrent nature demands a greater measure of deterrence. As
with the individual lawyer who commits multiple infractions, the
existence of codified professional guidelines has proven insufficient to
induce the offices' compliance with the codes. Alternative remedies
are ineffective because, for the most part, these intentional violations
are hidden from the alternative regulators as well.
Thus, when violations in this category do come to light,
cumulative remedial action may make sense even if administrative or
judicial regulation does address the individual prosecutor's conduct.
Here there is a good case for "making an example" of the offender-
to send a message to other prosecutors that, while the likelihood of
discovery and punishment is small, the sanction will be significant.165
Arguably, disciplinary authorities should be less willing than in cases
involving isolated misconduct to defer action on the basis that courts
have already addressed the misconduct.
The fourth type of violation in which the bar's justifications for
minimal discipline seem less valid involves public misconduct that
comes easily to the bar's attention. The most obvious example is
prosecutorial violations of the rules against speaking to the press
during litigation. 66 Many such violations are easily identified; by
intention, they appear in the newspapers and other media sources.
164. See supra text accompanying note 153 (discussing "serious violations").
165. There is a strong body of economics literature on deterrence and, in particular, the
combination of sanction, frequency of sanction, and publicity given to a sanction that will
best encourage future malefactors to avoid similar misconduct. See, e.g., DARYL A.
HELLMAN & NEIL 0. ALPER, ECONOMICS OF CRIME: THEORY AND PRACTICE (2d ed.
1990) (discussing the effect of deterrence in numerous criminal contexts); see also Gary S.
Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 172
(1968) (listing factors that influence deterrence); Isaac Ehrlich, Crime, Punishment, and
the Market for Offenses, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 43, 44-52 (1996) (discussing a market model
of crime); Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as
a Deterrent, 85 COLuM. L. REv. 1232, 1241-46 (1985) (discussing the optimal use of
nonmonetary sanctions).
This literature highlights another aspect of the problem that this Article has not
discussed-the possibility that disciplinary sanctions are too weak. See Levin, supra note
118, at 48, 68-80 (noting that the most frequently imposed discipline, admonitions, "have
little sting and convey a weak message about the unacceptability of a lawyer's conduct");
Rosen, supra note 3, at 736 (arguing that "[b]oth the courts and the bar disciplinary bodies
must start punishing Brady-type misconduct more harshly"). That subject is beyond the
scope of this Article for two reasons. First, I am responding specifically to the claims of
critics that the bar acts too infrequently in prosecuting prosecutors. Second, the
magnitude of a particular sanction is not within the control, or the exclusive control, of
disciplinary authorities because it typically is subject to judicial review.
166. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6 (1999) (regulating trial publicity).
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For this type of misconduct, regulators within prosecutors'
offices are unlikely to take remedial action; the individual
prosecutor's decision to speak publicly typically represents an office
decision geared toward improving the chances of conviction or of
enhancing the image of the office itself.67 Courts may criticize
prosecutors for speaking publicly, but they rarely take punitive
action.168 Courts' remedial authority also may be limited for such out-
of-court misconduct, which arguably does not directly affect the
evidence. 69 If the bar expects the prohibitions in the professional
rules to have force, they must be implemented by some entity. Yet in
practice, prosecutors rarely have been disciplined for their
violations.
70
Similarly, when judicial opinions mention prosecutorial
misconduct, one would expect almost automatic bar action (though
not necessarily automatic discipline).171 The opinions bring the
One should not underestimate the constitutional obstacles to disciplining lawyers for their
speech. See, e.g., Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1075-76 (1991) (permitting gag rules
geared to prevent a "substantial likelihood of material prejudice" to a fair trial).
Nevertheless, most professional codes have been modified in an effort to satisfy
constitutional standards. Yet, violations of the codes continue to occur without much
reaction from the bar.
167. Thus, in the OJ. Simpson case, for example, the hierarchy in the District
Attorney's Office not only failed to discourage the prosecutors trying the case from public
comment, but the district attorney himself made statements designed to encourage public
support for the prosecution. See Cole & Zacharias, supra note 46, at 1630-41 (cataloguing
and discussing the public statements of the lawyers in the Simpson case). Likewise,
Independent Counsel Prosecutor Kenneth Starr's decision to appear on television news
shows during the investigation of President Clinton was a transparent strategic office
decision to curry public favor.
168. See GERSHMAN, supra note 4, §§ 6.2-6.3 (citing numerous cases in which courts
have observed improper statements by prosecutors). The courts' authority may be
limited. When a court rule or specific gag order forbids speaking to the press, a judge may
punish a violation by exercising the contempt power. More frequently, however, a court
can only refer a lawyer's conduct to the bar and warn the lawyer that further violations
could lead to a mistrial, change of venue, or contempt sanctions. Stronger remedies, such
as the exclusion of evidence or dismissal, typically are not available for lawyer misconduct
relating to public statements. See id. § 6.4 (discussing sanctions and remedies for
prosecutorial speech to the press).
169. See supra note 147.
170. See supra Parts H(A)-(B) (discussing when prosecutors have been disciplined).
Among the few pertinent discipline cases are Zimmermann v. Board of Professional
Responsibility, 764 S.W.2d 757, 760-61 (Tenn. 1989) (prosecutor reprimanded) and In re
Hansen, 584 P.2d 805, 806-07 (Utah 1978) (same). Cf In re Conduct of Lasswell, 673 P.2d
855, 859-60 (Or. 1983) (proceedings instituted against prosecutor for making extrajudicial
statements, but allegations dismissed on grounds that the prosecutor lacked the requisite
intent).
171. As discussed above, bar authorities should avoid a regime in which their conduct
creates incentives for courts not to enforce constitutional protections in the underlying
criminal cases. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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misconduct to the bar's attention and create a basis for a substantial
suspicion that a code violation has occurred. In some cases, the bar
may determine that the judicial remedy (and maybe simply the
court's criticism) suffices as a sanction for an individual prosecutor
and as a deterrence against similar future misconduct by this
prosecutor and others. Yet in many cases, the judicial remedy will be
superficial-at least in terms of its direct consequences for the
prosecutor. 172 Because the bar can easily learn of these violations, the
typical excuse for a lack of action disappears. 173
We have already touched upon the fifth, and perhaps most
important, set of violations with respect to which more frequent
discipline seems warranted. Whenever alternative remedies are
insufficient to deter prosecutorial misconduct, it becomes more
necessary for the bar to intervene. The insufficiency of alternative
remedies may occur for three independent reasons: (1) the
alternative remedies, by their very nature, may be inadequate to
deter; (2) the alternative remedies, in practice, may be used too rarely
or may lack adequate force; or (3) prosecutors may have strong
incentives to violate the rules whether or not the alternative sanctions
are imposed.
Violations of the trial publicity rules again provide the best
example.74 Other examples include violations of the rules against
interfering with third party (e.g., witness) rights, 75 seeking a waiver of
rights from defendants,' 76 and asserting personal opinions at trial.177
172. Often, appellate courts simply refer to alleged prosecutorial misconduct or
constitutional violations without mentioning the prosecutor by name. Many violations are
recognized but treated as harmless error. Even when courts assign error to a particular
prosecutor's conduct and reverse a case, the impact on the prosecutor's reputation and
career may be muted by virtue of the fact that the prosecutor has gone into private
practice in the period leading up to the appellate decision.
173. Of course, the fact that a court finds prosecutorial misconduct does not necessarily
mean that the disciplinary authorities would agree that discipline is appropriate. See
Rosen, supra note 3, at 720-31 (tracing the progress in the disciplinary process of nine
cases in which courts have found prosecutors to have committed misconduct).
174. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
175. For example, prosecutors have incentives to induce unrepresented witnesses and
co-conspirators to cooperate with prosecutions. They often encourage these parties to
make statements or cooperate when a lawyer would otherwise advise them to assert their
right to remain silent. Yet the professional codes typically caution all lawyers in the
position of the prosecutors to avoid misleading the third person or suggesting that she is
offering disinterested advice. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 4.3
(1999).
176. The professional codes impose on prosecutors some obligation to safeguard an
accused's constitutional rights even when doing so would interfere with the prosecution's
ability to obtain evidence and gain a conviction. See, e.g., id R. 3.8(b)-(c) (requiring
prosecutors to safeguard the right to counsel and to avoid seeking a waiver of pretrial
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Prosecutors are unlikely to fear internal discipline for these
violations, because the prosecutors ordinarily engage in them with
their superiors' tacit approval; the violations may help convict
defendants who deserve punishment. Even in the more egregious
cases, supervisors may avoid taking action-especially public action-
for fear of encouraging an outcry or a political backlash against the
office.
Unless these types of misconduct violate minimal constitutional
standards, courts are unlikely to become involved.1 8 Courts hesitate
to impose remedies for misconduct that benefit potentially guilty
defendants. When the conduct occurs pre-trial and out-of-court,
some judges even have taken the position that courts have no
supervisory power to regulate the conduct. 9 If the threat of bar
discipline also is absent, prosecutors have every incentive, and little
disincentive, to engage in violations that will help them produce
convictions.
B. The Costs of Failing to Enforce the Codes
In separate works, I have suggested that professional codes serve
many valid functions other than providing a basis for discipline. They
can identify moral issues, promote moral introspection by lawyers
about appropriate conduct, influence judicial standards, and facilitate
rights from unrepresented defendants).
177. See, e.g., id. R. 3.4(e) (forbidding lawyers to assert "personal knowledge" or allude
to matters not supported by "admissible evidence"); cf Alschuler, supra note 44, at 642
(citing numerous examples of improper, inflammatory argument by prosecutors);
Zacharias, Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, supra note 13, at 95-97 & nn.219-25 (discussing
the legitimate bounds of prosecutorial argument).
178. Indeed, that was the thrust of Imbler v. Pachtnan, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), the case
with which this article began. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. The Court upheld
the notion of prosecutorial immunity and the frequent decisions by the Supreme Court to
find prosecutorial misconduct as not rising to the level of a constitutional violation as
justified by the availability of professional discipline as a remedy for the misconduct. See
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 429; see also Zacharias, Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, supra note 13, at
47 n.7 ("Courts have declined to strengthen legal and constitutional controls, based in part
on the belief that independent professional regulation best constrains prosecutorial
behavior.").
Appellate court supervision often is even less realistic than trial court supervision.
Appellate courts rarely will impose the most meaningful sanction of dismissing a case
outright. See supra note 149. Reversal for a new trial may be effective, but only if the
prosecutor who committed the misconduct remains in the prosecutor's office and suffers
the repercussions of the reversal. Direct censure of the prosecutor in appellate opinions is
a remedy that can have some effect, but only in public cases in which the media and peer
observers are likely to focus on the opinions.
179. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 45-47 (1992) (apparently limiting
supervisory power of lower federal courts to "in-court" conduct).
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communication within the bar.180  As a rule, one cannot fairly
conclude that the bar's failure to seek or impose discipline in a
particular case purges the prevailing code of value or meaning.
Nevertheless, when disciplinary agencies fail to enforce the codes
altogether, or fail to enforce them against a segment of the bar, they
encourage disrespect for the codes' letter and spirit.
This disrespect can take numerous forms. At the simplest level,
the affected segment of the bar-here prosecutors-may simply have
less inclination to follow the governing code's mandates. More
subtly, if prosecutors' adversaries (i.e., defense counsel) perceive that
prosecutors are unwilling to satisfy the professional standards, the
adversaries may feel a need to counteract the prosecutorial
misconduct by engaging in misconduct of their own. Thus, for
example, prosecutors who speak to the press about matters in
litigation encourage defense attorneys to do the same, if only to level
the playing field.' To the extent that defense attorneys mimic
prosecutorial misconduct and themselves are not disciplined, this in
turn will reduce their own respect for the codes and for the
disciplinary authorities in other areas.
As a practical matter, the absence of discipline can, in some areas
of prosecutorial misconduct, create a vacuum in the remedial scheme.
This Article began by noting that constitutional standards for
prosecutorial conduct provide only a minimum baseline and that, in
some areas, courts look to professional discipline as the preferred
remedy. Even if disciplinary authorities are justified in preserving
resources with respect to some code violations, the authorities need
to acknowledge their role in the overall framework of misconduct
deterrence.
180. See generally Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes, supra
note 49, at 231-39 (discussing the various functions of professional codes); Fred C.
Zacharias, Reconceptualizing Ethical Roles, 65 GEO. W. L. REv. 169, 180 (1997)
(discussing the implementation of subsidiary goals of the professional codes); Fred C.
Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 TEx. L. REV. 335, 344 (1994) (discussing the
various purposes of the professional codes).
181. Cf. United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1183-84 (2d Cir. 1981) (lamenting the
failure of prosecutors to "abide by [the] well-established rules limiting the types of
comments permissible in summation").
182. Indeed, the Model Rules implement the notion of leveling the playing field by
allowing a lawyer to "make [an otherwise prohibited public] statement that a reasonable
lawyer would believe is required to protect a client from the substantial undue prejudicial
effect of recent publicity not initiated by the lawyer or the lawyer's client." MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 3.6(c) (1999).
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Abdication of enforcement also contributes to a public sense that
a double-standard exists.1t As already discussed, there are good
reasons why the bar might fairly choose to discipline prosecutors less
frequently than private attorneys. But when this tendency is carried
to the extreme, observers are more apt to overlook the valid
justifications and to assume a double-standard. This may contribute
to less faith in bar regulation, a greater desire or demand for outside
regulation, or simply a broader dissatisfaction with the codes
themselves as a valid source of professional norms.184
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The above analysis concludes that, at least sometimes, bar
authorities are remiss in their obligation to review prosecutorial
violations of the professional rules. Yet, the analysis also suggests
that the failure of disciplinary authorities to discipline prosecutors as
frequently as private lawyers and for all instances of "prosecutorial
misconduct" is not entirely due to negligence, as most commentaries
have implied. There are good reasons why disciplinary authorities do
not, or cannot, seek to discipline prosecutors with respect to
particular aspects of the codes. And, even when discipline is possible,
the authorities may sometimes forebear from prosecuting for
reasonable resource allocation and other considerations.
The value of the analysis is twofold. First, and perhaps most
importantly, it suggests a need for what Professor Bruce Green terms
"more transparency" in the disciplinary process.185 If one cost of
minimal discipline is a loss of public faith in the process' 86-even
when good reasons for refraining from discipline exist-more public
discussion of how disciplinary agencies handle complaints about
prosecutors seems warranted. More openness about the disciplinary
process on the part of the regulators, including the publication of
183. See, e.g., HALL, supra note 4, § 11:3, at 390 ("The relative paucity of disciplinary
actions against prosecutors, and then imposition of a 'slap on the wrist' for even egregious
misconduct demonstrates that there is a disciplinary double standard." (citations
omitted)).
184. See, e.g., Roberta K. Flowers, What You See Is What You Get: Applying the
Appearance of Impropriety Standard to Prosecutors, 63 Mo. L. RV. 699, 704-12, 732-33
(1998) [hereinafter Flowers, Impropriety Standard] (arguing the importance of
maintaining the public perception that prosecutors are required to act with propriety); cf
Steele, supra note 4, at 979 ("Frequent misconduct by prosecutors is subversive to the
perception that the American legal profession is capable of self-policing professional
standards.").
185. Correspondence from Bruce A. Green to Fred Zacharias (Nov. 21, 1999) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review).
186. See supra note 181-83 and accompanying text.
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statistics, would be a welcome development. The academy, for its
part, should undertake more and better empirical research into the
reality of prosecutorial discipline.' 7
The second value of this Article's analysis lies in pinpointing
those areas in which the excuses for limited discipline evaporate. It
often makes sense, and is easier, for bar authorities to concentrate on
misconduct by private attorneys. But that does not translate into a
good policy justification for ignoring the prosecution corps altogether.
The reported cases suggest that when the authorities have
prosecuted prosecutors, they have targeted legitimate categories of
violations." s In particular, the authorities do seem to have targeted
particularly serious prosecutorial misconduct and cases in which
private clients are affected and public remedies are unlikely to
address the prosecutor's behavior. Yet the bar does not seem to have
a coherent strategy to target other areas of prosecutorial misconduct
in which professional discipline is particularly appropriate. These
areas include recurring and serious violations, violations that are
themselves public or are alluded to in judicial opinions, and those in
which alternative remedies are especially ineffective. The authorities
may have good reason not to pursue individual instances of
misconduct that fit these categories-for example, the availability and
effectiveness of alternative remedies. But the overall trend of
infrequent prosecutions suggests neglect or sloth.
In order to address these areas in a coherent way, bar authorities
need to adjust their traditional procedures for instituting
investigations. Because of the absence of likely complainants, a
proactive approach to discipline is required. Disciplinary agencies
should assign staff to review media reports of prosecutions that refer
to potentially questionable prosecutorial conduct (e.g., speaking to
the press) and to review local court opinions that identify
prosecutorial misconduct. 189
Once potential cases come to light, and before undertaking a
factual investigation, the bar should subject the cases to an analysis
governed by internal guidelines that provide standards for resolving
resource allocation questions. These guidelines should, at a
minimum, require consideration of the seriousness of the potential
187. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
188. See supra Part II.A.
189. Cf Rosen, supra note 3, at 697, 735-36 (proposing that "instead of relying solely
on complaints from individuals, bar disciplinary bodies should also review reported cases




offense, of whether it is the type of offense that is likely to occur
frequently within prosecutors' offices, of the availability of
meaningful alternative remedies for deterring similar misconduct by
this prosecutor and others, and of the resources that pursuing this
violation will require. When the determination is made that
professional discipline is necessary to maintain the integrity of the
governing rules, the disciplinary authorities should be willing to
embrace bar action.
It may also be necessary for the bar to adjust its theories of
discipline. In many respects, the critiques of the current regime focus
more on ongoing misconduct by prosecutors in general, rather than
on the compelling nature of particular prosecutors' behavior. If the
problem lies in the ethos of prosecutors' offices, disciplinary
authorities may need to consider targeting supervisors more than line
attorneys, to give supervisors incentives to produce better behavior
throughout their offices.' ° As in the private realm, the time may be
ripe to give regulatory authorities the power to impose fines or other
"entity" sanctions on prosecutors' offices. 19'
Amending the regulatory regime as discussed above would lead
to more frequent professional discipline of prosecutors, but certainly
not to the degree desired by the commentators who envision
discipline as a remedy for all (or even most) prosecutorial
misconduct. As previously noted, this Article's recommendations are
targeted at those kinds of violations for which the professional
disciplinary scheme is well-suited. What that means, for the critics, is
that the focus of their arguments should shift to alternatives that
might be more effective in addressing their concerns.
If, for example, bar discipline is suitable mainly for violations
that become public, how should routine but surreptitious misconduct
be rectified? Greater focus on internal training, supervision, and
guidelines seems to be required because, by definition, hidden
conduct is known (at least in a general way) within a prosecution
office, but nowhere else.
Alternatively, how can more violations be brought to public
attention? One commentator already has suggested the development
190. Most professional codes already provide some authority to impose discipline on
supervisory attorneys. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 5.1(b) (1999)
(requiring supervisors to "make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer
conforms to the rules of professional conduct").
191. See, e.g., Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, 77 CORNELL L.
REV. 1, 4-5 (1991) (analyzing entity responsibility for law firms); Zacharias, Reconciling
Professionalism, supra note 163, at 1371-73 (discussing the theory of entity liability).
2001]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
of mechanisms designed to encourage trial courts to refer more
instances of prosecutorial misconduct to the bar.192 Another, perhaps
overenthusiastically, has suggested the establishment of an
independent commission charged exclusively with the investigation of
prosecutorial misconduct. 93 Other fruitful areas of inquiry might be
the development of incentives for defendants or defense counsel to
use the disciplinary process and methods for coordinating media
attention and disciplinary review.
Similarly, if bar authorities justifiably avoid cases involving well-
intended, harmless, or less serious prosecutorial misconduct, the
remedial focus may need to shift to providing greater guidance to
prosecutors through more specific ethical standards 94 and to
enhancing institutional job performance constraints. Perhaps
prosecutors' offices need to be encouraged to emphasize adherence
to professional standards in pay and job evaluations. For this
encouragement to be realistic, the offices would require institutional
reassurances that taking limited action against staff will not be used as
a predicate for judicial reversal or onerous discipline. Or, as one
commentator has already suggested, prosecutors and their supervisors
192. See Williams, supra note 3, at 3477-78.
193. See Morton, supra note 4, at 1114-15; cf. Steele, supra note '4, at 982-88
(proposing establishment of a "Prosecutors' Grievance Council"). It is not altogether
clear that the frequency of prosecutorial misconduct would justify the devotion of so many
resources to the matter. Moreover, other than providing additional financial support for
investigations, it is unclear what such a commission could accomplish that current
disciplinary authorities could not achieve as well.
194. Such standards might be produced internally, within prosecutors' offices, or
through rewriting of the codes. Compare, e.g., Zacharias, Plea Bargaining, supra note 55,
at 1184 (advocating the adoption of internal standards governing plea bargaining goals),
with Aaron, supra note 55, at 3027-28 (urging adoption of a new professional code
provision governing disclosure of information that would affect plea bargaining), and
Letter from Bruce Green to Nancy Moore (Nov. 8, 1999) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review) (urging more specific rules requiring heightened candor of prosecutors to
courts and defendants, and imposing responsibilities upon prosecutors having to do with
post-conviction evidence, the rights of witnesses and third parties, and specific evidentiary
situations), and Secunda, supra note 56, at 1286-87 (proposing clearer professional rule
governing prosecutors in the sentencing process). See also Genson & Martin, supra note
1, at 59 (urging better education of prosecutors and the maintenance of an "internal policy
manual"); cf. Flowers, Impropriety Standard, supra note 184, at 734-35 (urging application
of a broad "appearance of impropriety standard" to govern prosecutorial conduct);
Flowers, Updating the Ethics Codes, supra note 13, at 927 (urging the adoption of
amendments to the professional codes to regulate prosecutors' investigative functions
more precisely); Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors, supra note 3, at 71-72 (advocating
the need for more precise standards for prosecutors because prosecutors may have a
different view of what is acceptable or appropriate than other lawyers).
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might need a new kind of incentive to adhere to the professional
codes.195
And judges, perhaps, need some reeducation. Imbler v.
Pachtman's reference to the existence of professional discipline as
grounds for immunizing prosecutors from legal action and
constitutional review has been repeated often in subsequent cases. 96
Yet, as this Article suggests, Imbler's premise is not realistic.'9 Bar
authorities do not, and probably cannot, fill the void in prosecutorial
oversight across the board. Just as the bar must determine what role
it can reasonably play, so too must the courts. 98
CONCLUSION
Recent federal legislation, the Ethical Standards for Federal
Prosecutors Act,"9 provides that federal prosecutors "shall be subject
to State laws and rules ... governing attorneys in each State where
such attorney engages in that attorney's duties, to the same extent
and in the same manner as other attorneys in that State."'" The
federal law seems to assume and rely upon the existence of regular
state discipline of prosecutors.20 One commentator has suggested
that the law's adoption itself will "increase the incidence of state bar
assertions of discipline over prosecutors."'" The history of the
195. See Meares, supra note 40, at 873-83 (suggesting the use of financial incentives as
a mechanism for regulating prosecutorial conduct); cf. Simon, supra note 39, at 12-13, 57
(applauding a federal statute providing for attorneys fees when wrongful prosecutions are
instituted).
196. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
197. See Douglas J. McNamara, Buckley, Imbler and Stare Decisis: The Present
Predicament of Prosecutorial Immunity and an End to Its Absolute Means, 59 ALB. L.
REV. 1135, 1184-88 (1996) (urging the abandonment of Imbler, in part, because of the
"unfulfilled promise of alternative deterrence").
198. See, e.g., Auler, supra note 41, at 643-45 (pre-Imbler article urging broader
availability of civil remedies for prosecutorial misconduct). To a very limited extent, the
United States Supreme Court has retreated from Imbler's absolute immunity doctrine. In
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993), the Court held that some prosecutorial acts
in the investigative stage of the criminal process are only entitled to qualified immunity,
but that once the prosecutor has probable cause and therefore adopts an "advocacy" role,
absolute immunity becomes applicable. See id. at 267-78; see also Barrow, supra note 3, at
323-29 (criticizing Buckley and suggesting alternatives); McNamara, supra note 197, at
1138, 1149-54 (analyzing Buckley and urging that Imbler be overruled).
199. 28 U.S.C.A. § 530B (West Supp. 1999).
200. Id
201. For a full analysis of the Ethical Standards for Federal Prosecutors Act, see
Zacharias & Green, supra note 10, passim.
202. Caroline Heck Miller, Knowing the Dancer from the Dance: When the Prosecutor
is Punished for the Government's Conduct, 29 STETSON L. REv. 69,89 (1999) (arguing that
the federal law may encourage "state bar jurisdiction" or stimulate "additional grievances
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discipline of prosecutors, discussed in this Article, casts doubt on that
proposition. But the new legislation does make it all the more
important to understand how state disciplinary agencies view their
role in supervising prosecutorial misconduct.0 3
This Article has attempted to consider the issues surrounding the
professional discipline of prosecutors dispassionately. If one
examines the available empirical data-the cases and the nature of
the code provisions that might give rise to discipline-one cannot
help but conclude that the traditional lamentations regarding the
absence of bar discipline are somewhat overblown, but also contain a
large measure of truth. The bar has not abstained entirely. Neither
has it fulfilled its commitment to maintaining the letter and spirit of
the codes.
These conclusions suggest that it is time for disciplinary
authorities to engage in self-analysis. At a minimum, regulatory
agencies should formulate concrete guidelines for when discipline of
prosecutors is warranted. They should pursue discipline proactively
when appropriate.
At the same time, the Article's analysis suggests that critics of the
bar should reevaluate their stance as well. It is time to address the
issue of prosecutorial misconduct more contextually. We should
focus our attention on remedies that have a realistic chance to work.
to be filed against prosecutors").
203. See Zacharias & Green, supra note 10, at 216, 235-42 (discussing various
conceptions of federal and state prosecutors that may affect the attitude of professional
regulators).
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